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Our initial goal had been to write jointly, with the hope that we could 
bridge our differences to find, if not common, at least neighboring, ground.  
On some points we did so, but ultimately our divergent appreciations of the 
proper way to interpret the condition precedent in the investment treaty in 
BG Group overcame the idealism with which we commenced the project.  
Nonetheless we have decided to present the two papers together to 
emphasize the dichotomous approaches to treaty interpretation that two 
moderately sensible people, who inhabit overlapping but non-congruent 
interpretive communities, can have.   
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I. CROSSING THE THRESHOLD: ARBITRAL JURISDICTION AFTER BG GROUP 
Alan Scott Rau
*
 
A. The Allocation of Decision-Making Power 
The subject I have chosen for this paper—really, the ultimate question 
in all of our law of arbitration—is the allocation of responsibility between 
state courts and arbitrators.  If arbitrators as private individuals assume the 
power to adjudicate the affairs of others—that is, if they presume to bind 
others with definitive judgments—where does this authority come from?  
And who makes the decision with respect to the existence or scope of that 
power? 
A familiar and useful analytical framework for approaching this 
problem asks us to begin by differentiating between three separate levels of 
inquiry.1  All three will recur in connection with any arbitration, and it is 
critical to keep them distinct.  They are: 
1. How should a particular substantive issue be decided?  This is a 
matter of deciding how the substantive law should be applied to any 
contested question, which of course includes any merits-based 
defense, such as an allegation that a contract is invalid for fraud. 
2. “Who is to decide the level #1 issue?”  This asks who—court or 
arbitrator—has decision-making power over that issue?  For 
example, in the paradigm case of “separability,” who is to 
determine the merits of a claim of fraudulent inducement?  (“Did 
the parties agree to arbitrate it?”)  Or, if an arbitration clause is 
drafted to encompass disputes over the shipment of “fruit,” did the 
parties agree to submit to the arbitration of disputes over the sale of 
tomatoes or pecans?2  To the extent that a decision at this level is 
entrusted to arbitrators, courts would be expected not only to defer 
prospectively (by refusing to rule), but after the fact as well (by 
limiting review to narrow statutory grounds). 
3. And finally, just who is to decide the level #2 issue?  Does a “level 
 
 * Mark G. & Judy G. Yudof Chair in Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law. 
 1. See Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know About “Separability” in 
Seventeen Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 92–94 (2003). 
 2. See William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural 
Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 675 (1989).  
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#2” question truly implicate what is usually referred to as the 
“jurisdiction” of the arbitral tribunal—so that (as one might expect) 
the decision necessarily falls to a court?  Or by contrast, are there 
circumstances where the arbitral tribunal itself may have the power 
to pass with finality on its own authority?3  To the extent a party’s 
challenge is persuasively framed as one that indeed goes to the 
“jurisdiction” of the tribunal, the underlying premise is that this is 
simply not the sort of process to which he had ever been willing to 
subject himself.
4
  So a challenge framed in this way is thus little 
more than shorthand or label for an assertion that the ultimate 
question of power (at least in the paradigm New York Convention 
case) is necessarily for a court.  And so, if the arbitrators presumed 
to decide it, then—barring some alchemy in the form of a 
contractual re-allocation5—a court will at some point review their 
exercise of power de novo. 
This third level of analysis is by far the most arcane and esoteric, and 
naturally therefore it has attracted the most scholarly interest.  It is the 
subject of this essay.  Just like the inquiry at “level #2,” the inquiry at “level 
#3” must, in the end, turn on the scope of consent—everything rests on an 
assessment of the parties’ contractual understanding.  And in this regard: 
1. When faced with textual “silence,” we are expected to do the usual 
work of ferreting out the parties’ presumed intent with respect to the 
appropriate decision maker.  The choice of an appropriate default 
rule, as always, proceeds by attempting to find the solution that 
“will ‘most closely mimic the hypothetical bargain that the parties 
themselves would have chosen in a completely spelled-out 
agreement’—or perhaps, the bargain that most similarly situated 
parties would have chosen—or at least, the bargain that it would be 
rational for such parties to have chosen ex ante.”6  One tactic is to 
 
 3. The “gateway”/”threshold” meme is fraught and has become subject to much 
misunderstanding.  I trust it will be understood that I am not at all talking here about the question of 
timing—that is, the question of who, between court and arbitrator, has the mere chronological 
priority in decision making.  For this distinction, see Alan Scott Rau, Arbitrating “Arbitrability,” 7 
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 487, 488–92 (2013).  
 4. See Rau, supra note 1, at 94–97. 
 5. See infra Part I.E. 
 6. See Alan Scott Rau, “Consent” to Arbitral Jurisdiction: Disputes with Non-Signatories, in 
MULTIPLE PARTY ACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 69, 96 (Permanent Court of 
Arbitration ed., 2009).  
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align presumed intent with “comparative competence”;7 another 
heuristic is “to presume intent on the basis of what will reduce 
overall costs”—both transaction costs (e.g., in the interest of 
avoiding multiple proceedings) and error costs (e.g., in the interest 
of trying to identify comparative decision-making competence)—
thereby “maximizing a joint surplus that the parties can in 
bargaining divide among themselves.”8 
Choosing the proper default rule does not really require us “to read the 
minds of parties who assuredly had not been thinking about this matter at 
all.”9  On the contrary: it merely requires us to attribute to them, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary—as a rough guess—a mere starting 
point—the intention to act efficiently in the interest of maximizing mutual 
gains.10  Precisely these same considerations ought to inform our choice 
whether to characterize a particular objection to arbitration as one of 
 
 7. See generally Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85 (2002) (“The NASD 
arbitrators, comparatively more expert about the meaning of their own rule, are comparatively better 
able to interpret and to apply it,” and “it is reasonable to infer that the parties intended the agreement 
to reflect that understanding.”).   
  The Howsam inquiry was conducted at “level #3.”  Were arbitrators empowered to adjudicate 
allegedly stale claims where a contract provision purported to make such claims no longer “eligible” 
for arbitration?  For the Court, an analysis of presumed intent suggested that such concerns of 
“eligibility”—although they may in some sense have stood at the “gateway” to final disposition of 
the dispute—did not implicate arbitral jurisdiction; since the “parties would likely expect that an 
arbitrator would decide the gateway matter,” it was “a matter presumptively for the arbitrator, not for 
the judge.”  Id. at 84–85.  “In other words, the parties may well have agreed explicitly not to 
arbitrate untimely claims—but that is not at all the same thing as saying ‘that they have agreed not to 
arbitrate disputes over timeliness.’”  Alan Scott Rau, “The Arbitrability Question Itself,” 10 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 287, 330 (1999) [hereinafter Rau, Arbitrability Question]. 
  Also conducted at “level #3” was the inquiry in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 
U.S. 444, 452–53 (2003) (arbitral order for class-wide proceedings; arbitrators are “well situated” to 
answer the question of “what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to”).  The present 
currency of the plurality decision in Bazzle remains in some doubt.  But cf. Blue Cross Blue Shield 
of Mass., Inc. v. BCS Ins. Co., 671 F.3d 635, 639–40 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting post-Bazzle authority 
leaves it to arbitrators to order consolidation remains “in place”; it is for the tribunal to “both 
interpret the contract and exercise any discretion that the contract allows”); Alan Scott Rau, “Gap 
Filling” by Arbitrators, in ICCA CONGRESS SERIES VOLUME 18: LEGITIMACY: MYTHS, REALITIES, 
CHALLENGES 935, 990 n.185 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2015) (Bazzle may be “left intact” with 
respect to arbitral orders for the consolidation of related arbitrations). 
 8. Rau, supra note 6, at 96–97. 
 9. Cf. Jan Paulsson, Jurisdiction and Admissibility, in GLOBAL REFLECTIONS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMERCE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 601, 612 (Gerald Aksen et al. eds., 
2005). 
 10. See Rau, supra note 6, at 96–97. 
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“jurisdiction” or alternatively as something else, like “admissibility.” 
2. Contractual “silence” is a curious notion, one that can mean 
everything and nothing.11  An alternative approach is one that would 
set out to worry the text of the agreement itself—or the text of some 
body of institutional rules—and end by finding an express re-
allocation by the parties of the “level #2” question to the arbitrators 
themselves for a final decision.12 
Both of these approaches are implicated in a recent decision of the 
United States Supreme Court, the culmination of litigation that had attracted 
substantial interest and concern on the part of the international arbitral 
community. 
B. BG Group v. Argentina 
“This case goes to the heart of whether it is the arbitral tribunal that 
has the exclusive say on its own competence or whether national 
courts have a limited role in ensuring that arbitral tribunals cannot 
egregiously depart from the consent of the parties.”13 
Many bilateral investment treaties impose preliminary hurdles to the 
assertion of a claim by an investor.  Those of Argentina tend to be somewhat 
unusual.  The Argentina-U.K. BIT—and to similar effect in agreements with 
some other states, notably Canada, Italy, Korea, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland, but most rarely otherwise—provides that: 
 “Disputes with regard to an investment . . . which have not been 
amicably settled shall be submitted at the request” of an investor to 
the courts of the host state;14 but then,  
 “The aforementioned disputes” may be submitted to arbitration 
“where, after a period of eighteen months has elapsed” from the 
time the dispute was submitted to the host-state courts, “the said 
 
 11. See generally Rau, Arbitrability Question, supra note 7. 
 12. See infra Part I.E. 
 13. Michael Waibel, Investment Arbitration: Jurisdiction and Admissibility 24 (Univ. of 
Cambridge Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 9/2014, 2014), http://www.academia.edu/ 
8680141/Investment_Arbitration_Jurisdiction_and_Admissibility. 
 14. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, U.K.-Arg., art. 8(1), Dec. 11, 1990, 1765 U.N.T.S. 34 [hereinafter U.K.-Arg. BIT]. 
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tribunal has not given its final decision,” or “the final decision . . . 
has been made but the Parties are still in dispute.”15 
It is hard to make much sense of these muddled provisions, which may 
not have been thought through coherently—an ill-considered amalgam of 
“cooling off” periods,16 requirements to exhaust local remedies, and simple 
choice-of-forum clauses17—and in reality, of course, not quite amounting to 
any of these. 
The British BG Group had acquired a majority stake in a newly 
privatized Argentine company given an exclusive license to distribute 
natural gas in Buenos Aires.18  It suffered considerable losses when 
Argentine legislation converted the original dollar-based tariffs into peso-
based tariffs; Argentina also barred from any “renegotiation process” any 
companies that were engaged in litigation or arbitration against Argentina. 
Under these circumstances—and despite the provisions of the BIT—BG 
Group saw no point in seizing the Argentine courts and directly sought 
arbitration.  By default under the treaty, the arbitration was to proceed under 
the UNCITRAL Rules, and the parties chose Washington, D.C. as the seat.  
The arbitral tribunal—finding that “recourse to the domestic judiciary” had 
 
 15. Id. at art. 8(2).  See generally José Alvarez & Gustavo Topalian, The Paradoxical Argentina 
Cases, 6 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 491, 510 (2012) (“recurrent jurisdictional issues in 
Argentine cases”). 
 16. E.g., CHRISTOPHER F. DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 117–19 (2008); 
Christoph Schreuer, Consent to Arbitration, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 830, 843–46 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008). 
 17. E.g., Kiliç Inşaat Ĭthalat Ĭhracat Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Republic of Turkm., 
ICSID No. ARB/10/1, Award (July 2, 2013), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-
documents/italaw1515_0.pdf.  As construed by this tribunal, a Turkish investor under the Turkey-
Turkmenistan BIT was required (a) to first bring a dispute before local courts, and could institute 
arbitration proceedings only if (b) it had not “received a final award within one year” (and 
presumably not at all if it had).  Id. ¶ 6.1.6 (emphasis added).  These steps were held to constitute a 
“condition precedent” to the State’s “offer to arbitrate” so that “the failure to meet these conditions 
goes to the existence of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.”  Id. ¶¶ 6.2.9, 6.3.15.  In a separate opinion, 
Professor Park cogently objected that thus to preclude arbitral authority would necessarily imply that 
an “unfair judgment” by the host courts would permanently “insulate a potentially discriminatory 
taking from arbitration” as long as the local courts had acted swiftly.  Id. ¶ 6.5.4; see infra notes 
46−49 and accompanying text (on the notion of “condition precedent”).  That the tribunal’s 
construction of the BIT here was indeed contestable is confirmed by the later contrary award—
reached after exhaustive consideration of linguistic expert testimony—in Muhammet Çap & Sehil 
Inşaat Endustri ve Ticaret Ltd. v. Turkmenistan, ICSID No. ARB/12/6, Decision on Objection to 
Jurisdiction (Feb. 13, 2015), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw 
4163.pdf. 
 18. See BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1204 (2014).  
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been “unilaterally prevented or hindered by the host state” so that a literal 
reading of the Treaty would “lead to [an] absurd and unreasonable result”—
affirmed its jurisdiction; it rendered an award of damages against Argentina 
of more than $185 million, plus interest and costs.19 
Note that this was a conventional Convention award, and thus subject to 
judicial review at the seat.  The first-level district court declined to overturn 
the award,20 but the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and 
ordered vacatur.21  The arbitrators had “exceeded their power.”22  While the 
decision concluded by asserting in a perfunctory and peremptory fashion 
that “there can be only one possible outcome” on the actual question of 
arbitral jurisdiction—the text of the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) 
provision was after all “explicit”—almost all of the court’s opinion was 
written instead at our “level #3.”  So the principal point was not really that 
arbitral “jurisdiction” was in fact lacking—but rather that no deference at all 
was due to the tribunal’s conclusion that it was present.  Since the 
“jurisdictional” question is “an independent question of law,” this was thus a 
matter that had to be decided by a court de novo.23 
This decision was vigorously criticized, with virtual unanimity, by those 
with close ties to the world of arbitration.  Review was sought in the 
Supreme Court, and an amicus curiae brief was written by concerned 
“professors and practitioners of arbitration law” arguing that the Court of 
Appeals’ judgment would upset the expectations of the international 
community (by which was apparently meant, the expectations of the 
 
 19. See id. at 1205.  
 20. The New York Convention primarily applies to “foreign awards,” but the U.S. is highly 
unusual in having expanded the reach of the Convention to arbitrations that are locally sited, albeit 
with some “international” connection.  Why this was done—and what this was intended to mean as a 
practical matter—no one really seems to know.  My own opinion is that this has very limited effect 
indeed.  See Alan Scott Rau, The New York Convention in American Courts, 7 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 
213, 214–18, 234–42 (1996). 
  In the face of continuing confusion, the district court never seemed quite sure whether the 
appropriate standard for assessing the validity of such “non-domestic” awards was to be found in the 
1925 U.S. statute or in the Convention itself—but then in the end seemed to correctly recognize that 
it didn’t really matter one way or the other.  See Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 764 F. 
Supp. 2d 21, 29–31 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 665 F.3d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled by 134 S. Ct. 
1198 (2014). 
 21. See Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled 
by 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014).  
 22. Id. at 1368. 
 23. See id. at 1371. 
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investing community).  The claim was that the lower court decision would 
set the U.S. on a “collision course” with the international arbitral regime—at 
the same time discouraging foreign users from choosing the U.S. as arbitral 
seat because of the failure of local courts to give proper “deference” to 
“arbitrators’ rulings on threshold issues.”24 
I note parenthetically that this is hardly the first occasion on which the 
“community of international arbitration practitioners” has attempted in this 
way to leverage its prestige to mesmerize, overawe, or bully, national courts 
into keeping their hands off the institution of international arbitration—in 
order to forestall “meddling” by local courts.25  Observe the rhetoric of self-
regulation harnessed to the wider agenda of delocalization—the notion of an 
“autonomous” arbitral mechanism being critical to the establishment bar in 
its attempt to ensure that any dependence on “parochial” state tribunals 
remains attenuated.26 
To the surprise of most observers—and against the advice of the United 
States Solicitor General27—the Supreme Court agreed to review the case; it 
 
 24. See generally Brief of Professors and Practitioners of Arbitration Law as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Reversal, BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014) (No. 12-138), 
2013 WL 4769419.  
 25. The locus classicus is YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDER 156–61 (1996) (calling attention to the “symbolic value” of the ICC’s brief in 
Mitsubishi and painting an “elite image of private justice,” the “essence of the ICC argument was, 
‘look at who we are’”). 
  In the BG Group litigation, the amicus brief filed by the American Arbitration Association 
went even further in this direction.  It stressed that the Court of Appeals’ decision had “been 
unanimously condemned by international arbitration users, including some of the most experienced 
practitioners, who often decide where to seat arbitration proceedings”—citing polemical blog entries 
written by members of the establishment bar and the members of the arbitral tribunal had all been 
“eminent”—indeed the president “teaches international investment law at Yale Law School.”  Brief 
of the American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at *20–25, BG 
Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014) (No. 12-138), 2013 WL 4781545.  
Quaere whether argument of this kind does not begin to verge on the unseemly.  Quaere whether it 
is even legal argument at all. 
 26. Cf. MICHAEL WAIBEL & YANHUI WU, ARE ARBITRATORS POLITICAL? 36 (2011) (cited with 
author permission) (empirical study of ICSID arbitrations provides support for hypothesis that 
“arbitrators in full time private practice are more likely to affirm jurisdiction,” a result “significant 
for the jurisdictional stage alone”). 
   “Les vertus se perdent dans l’intérêt comme les fleuves se perdent dans la mer.”  La 
Rochefoucauld, Maximes CLXXI. 
 27. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at *13, BG Grp., PLC 
v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014) (No. 12-138), 2013 WL 1945157 (“[T]he court of 
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ultimately reversed the Court of Appeals and ordered that the award be 
reinstated.28 
Justice Breyer, the author of some of the Court’s most important and 
insightful arbitration opinions (such as Howsam and First Options), seemed 
content with channeling the learning of those cases—his excessive 
familiarity with the subject doubtless leading him to feel exempt from the 
need to think things through from scratch.  So the opinion has a “paint by the 
numbers” feel—betraying perhaps what Henry James wonderfully called an 
“anxious excess of simplicity.”29  For Justice Breyer, to relegate claimants in 
the first instance to the Argentine courts was nothing more than a banal 
“claims processing requirement”—a “purely procedural” “condition 
precedent”30—and thus, essentially identical to those familiar cases where it 
is alleged that there is no longer,31 or not yet,32 any right to trigger 
arbitration—all questions traditionally left for final determination by the 
arbitrators themselves. 
But I wonder.  Can one, for example, be satisfied that in light of the 
conduct of the Government of Argentina, the arbitration should have been 
allowed to proceed33 without completely abandoning a preference for clear 
thinking?  The decision calls on us to ask a number of uncomfortable 
questions about which I can speculate here only briefly. 
C. “Consent,” Contract Formation, and “Conditions Precedent” 
The need for assurance that someone purporting to act as an “arbitrator” 
is not merely an officious intermeddler is a “point so banal, so 
commonplace, so formulaic, that readers justifiably wince when they see it 
 
appeals’ application of settled principles to the particular treaty provision at issue in this case [is a] 
narrow issue [that] does not warrant this Court’s review.”). 
 28. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1213 (2014). 
 29. LEON EDEL, HENRY JAMES: A LIFE 404 (1985). 
 30. BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1207.  
 31. E.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 81–82 (2002) (No dispute “shall 
be eligible for submission” after six years have elapsed.). 
 32. E.g., John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 553–59 (1964) (multi-stage 
grievance procedure). 
 33. The claimant’s argument did not fail to recount the history of Argentina’s “abusive” conduct 
and its “legendary” “disdain for the U.S. judiciary.”  Brief for Petitioner at *28–30, BG Grp., PLC v. 
Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014) (No. 12-138), 2013 WL 4587966. 
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repeated.”34  Arbitration’s “Prime Directive” thus requires that the arbitral 
process, as a “matter of contract,” must rest on a core finding of “consent,” a 
necessary corollary being that this question—whether the parties have 
agreed to arbitrate anything at all—is undeniably an issue for judicial 
determination.35  Is it really the case that there was, under these 
circumstances, “consent” on the part of Argentina to submit to arbitration? 
A BIT is often conceptualized not as an agreement with an investor—
who is after all not a party to it—but as an “offer” by the state, “accepted” 
by the investor upon filing a claim.36  In an effort to fit the case within this 
framework, Argentina naturally asserted that by bypassing the local courts, 
the claimant had failed to “accept” the state’s offer on the offered terms—so 
that seizing the arbitral tribunal could only amount to a “counter offer”—
with the corollary that the entire process of contract formation had been 
aborted.37  Much of the argument before the Court seemed to turn on these 
half-remembered fragments of elementary Contracts learning.38 
It was obviously not in the cards, though, that a case of this magnitude 
 
 34. Rau, supra note 1, at 71. 
 35. Insistence on this “Prime Directive” means that evidence of the parties’ consent to a final 
arbitral determination “must be rigorous indeed.”  And “within the gravitational field of this 
principle are the cases where the objecting party has in some sense agreed to ‘arbitration’ in the 
abstract, but has not necessarily agreed to be bound by a decision of the particular tribunal that the 
proponent is seeking to invoke”—e.g., “putative arbitrators have no power whatever to determine 
whether the parties wanted to submit to decision-makers chosen from the roster of the AAA, or 
alternatively, from the roster of the NASD.”  Rau, supra note 3, at 518.  Compare Garanti Koza LLP 
v. Turkm., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/20, Decision on the Objection to Jurisdiction for Lack of 
Consent, ¶¶ 26, 29 (July 3, 2013) (“The answer to whether Turkmenistan has consented to 
participate in any kind of arbitration” is yes; “the ratione voluntatis is thus established.”), with 
Garanti Koza LLP v. Turkm., ICSID Case No. ARB/11/20, Dissenting Opinion of Laurence Boisson 
de Chazournes, ¶ 26 (“[A] mutual agreement is needed for ICSID arbitration to be initiated by the 
foreign investor,” and absent such agreement “only” an ad hoc arbitration under UNCITRAL Rules 
“can be used by the foreign investor.”). 
 36. See generally Waibel, supra note 13, at 15 (“[I]nvestment treaties rely on the offer-and-
acceptance model inspired by similar models in domestic contract law.”). 
 37. Brief for Respondent at *31–32, BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198 
(2014) (No. 12-138), 2013 WL 5819691. 
 38. Id.; see also Muhammet Çap & Sehil Inşaat Endustri ve Ticaret Ltd. v. Turkm., ICSID No. 
ARB/12/6, Decision on Objection to Jurisdiction, ¶ 6.2.1 (Feb. 13, 2015) (“It is a fundamental 
principle that an agreement is formed by offer and acceptance,” and “there must be acceptance of the 
offer as made.”); cf. Transcript of Oral Argument at *21, BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 
134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014) (No. 12-138), 2013 WL 6229864 (Counsel for BG Group: Argentina says 
this case is analogous to someone posting “a sign on a pole [that] says . . . if you find my dog I will 
give you $100. . . .  [By the same token] it says we have to perform an act here.”).  But, counsel was 
quick to respond, “[a]rbitration is not a dog.” 
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would ultimately turn on little more than a point of first-year Contracts law.  
Perhaps that way of framing things might seem more compelling where the 
state’s “offer” to arbitrate is to be found only in a local statute or investment 
code—but surely it is at least equally plausible to characterize a BIT 
somewhat differently?  Suppose, for example, that initiating arbitration was 
seen not as a purported “acceptance” of an offer, but served instead to claim 
rights under an already-concluded prior agreement between the U.K. and 
Argentina—of which U.K. investors are deemed to be third-party 
beneficiaries.39  The rights of a third-party beneficiary may not, of course, 
rise higher than those of the named parties, but as a general matter no 
particular “assent” on his part is necessary at all to give him a right of action 
on the underlying contract.40 
The Court’s simple assumption (accompanied by neither discussion nor 
apparent doubt) that the claimant was a party to an agreement with 
Argentina41 led directly to its treatment of the local-litigation requirement as 
 
 39. Either frame is intended to help us understand investment arbitration “in terms of an 
agreement to arbitrate between the parties to the dispute.”  See ANDREA MARCO STEINGRUBER, 
CONSENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 61–65 (2012) (discusses and compares the literature on 
the “offer-acceptance mechanism” and the contrasting “juridical concept of stipulation pour 
autrui”). 
  With particular reference to the latter, see also Republic of Argentina v. BG Group, PLC, 764 
F. Supp. 2d 21, 35 (D.D.C. 2011) (To create duties to a third-party beneficiary, “the parties’ intent to 
benefit a third-party [must] be shown on the face of the contract.”), rev’d, 665 F.3d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 
2012), overruled by 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014); compare W. Laurence Craig, The Arbitrator’s Mission 
and the Application of Law, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 243, 257 (2010) (“The beneficiary of an 
arbitration clause in a bilateral investment treaty may be likened to the assignee of a contractual right 
to arbitrate.”).  Some years ago, Professor Bjorklund discussed the relevance of the “third-party-
beneficiary” frame to such issues as treaty withdrawal and pre- and post-dispute waiver of rights.  
See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Private Rights and Public International Law: Why Competition Among 
International Economic Law Tribunals Is Not Working, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 265–73 (2007).  
  This is an approach that, if sustained, would enable analysis to avoid entirely the canonical 
offer-and-acceptance model.  Where a brokerage firm as part of its membership agreement with the 
New York Stock Exchange commits to the arbitration of disputes with investors, no court has any 
difficulty in characterizing as a “third-party beneficiary” an investor who later asserts a claim.  E.g., 
Spears, Leeds & Kellogg v. Cent. Life Assurance Co., 85 F.3d 21, 26, 27 (2d Cir. 1996) (“No 
agreement is required between the parties to the arbitration before a non-member may invoke [the 
Exchange Rules]”; “[the claimants’] lack of direct contact with [the broker] does not prevent them 
from asserting their rights as third party beneficiaries”; and “a beneficiary need not be identified 
prior to seeking enforcement of its rights under a contract.”). 
 40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 306 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 41. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1206, 1208 (2014) (“we shall 
initially treat the document before us as if it were an ordinary contract between private parties”; 
“relax[ing] our ordinary contract assumption” changes nothing since “a treaty is a contract”). 
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nothing more than a “condition precedent.”42  This unthoughtful repetition of 
the “condition” trope is commonplace43 but unconscionably lazy; however 
much we cling to it for its reassuring familiarity, it is “confusing and 
misleading.”44  Justice Roberts raised this objection in his dissenting 
opinion, but I would fondly like to believe that I made essentially the same 
point a long time ago.45 
Note that a “condition precedent” may, in ordinary usage, invoke:  
 Something that must occur before one can say that any agreement of 
any sort whatsoever has been entered into;46 or 
 Something that must occur before any “separable” arbitration 
 
 42. Id. at 1210. 
 43. E.g., REVISED UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 6 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 2000) (“an arbitrator shall decide whether a condition precedent to arbitrability has 
been fulfilled”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 2-
15 (AM. LAW INST., Preliminary Draft No. 6, 2013) (“a court ordinarily declines to decide whether 
[an agreement] should be denied enforcement [because of a failure] to comply with a condition 
precedent”); id. § 2-7 & cmt. b; id. § 2-15 cmt. b (using “condition precedent defense” and 
“precondition to arbitration” interchangeably). 
 44. ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 30.7 (rev. ed. 1999); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 40, § 224 cmt. e (“This terminology is not 
followed here.”). 
 45. BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1216 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); cf. Alan Scott Rau, Federal Common 
Law and Arbitral Power, 8 NEV. L.J. 169, 170–74 (2007). 
 46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 40, § 217 illus. 2 (“A and B sign a 
written agreement for an exchange of real property and leave it with C, an attorney, on the oral 
understanding that it is not to take effect until each has consulted his wife and notified C that he still 
wishes to close the exchange.  There is no contract until each has notified C.”). 
  Commentators have suggested that this distinction between a conditional duty to perform and 
a condition precedent to the very “formation of a contract” is properly viewed as “highly artificial.”  
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 415 (5th ed. 2003).  Courts certainly 
experience considerable difficulty in making the distinction operational, and when it does rear its 
head, the explanation is most likely to be a court’s desire to avoid the constraints of the Parol 
Evidence Rule, a largely irrelevant anomaly of Anglo-American jurisprudence.  See id. at 144–45 
(“contract subject to an express condition”); see also Hicks v. Bush, 180 N.E.2d 425, 428 (N.Y. 
1962) (“no operative or binding contract ever came into existence[;] . . . it was their desire and 
understanding that the merger was to be one of proposal only and that, even though the formal 
preliminary steps were to be taken, the writing was not to become operative as a contract or the 
merger effective until $672,500 was raised”).  Still such holdings arise with some frequency.  See 
also Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v. BHG Structured Settlements, Inc., 202 S.W.3d 456, 461–62 (Tex. 
App. 2006) (a state statute required prior judicial approval of the transfer of rights to structured 
settlement payments; since judicial approval is “a condition precedent to the formation of an 
enforceable contract,” it follows that in the absence of such approval, “none of its provisions, 
including the arbitration clause, can be enforced”). 
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agreement comes into existence;47 or  
 Something that must occur before some present duty of 
performance under a contract is triggered;48 and, in particular, 
 Something that must occur before one becomes bound to engage in 
arbitration—for example, a claimant’s initial resort to consultation 
or mediation.49 
It must be a given that the first two will always be matters for judicial 
determination.  By contrast, I suppose the latter two may be deemed to have 
been entrusted to arbitrators.  And that is in fact the subject of the following 
section.  I note here simply that the Court’s reliance on a vague and obsolete 
taxonomy sheds little light on the matter, hiding these critical distinctions 
under a thick glaze of formalism.  Presumably the premise from which it 
proceeded was that the BIT’s litigation requirement constituted a “condition 
precedent” only in the final sense—but that’s the whole question underlying 
the case, isn’t it?  To label is not the same thing as to justify. 
D. The “Purely Procedural” 
That Argentina had in the abstract given its “consent” to arbitrate hardly 
 
 47. See, e.g., Empresa Generadora de Electricidad Itabo, S.A. v. Corporacion Dominicana de 
Empresas Electricas Estatales, No. 05 CIV 5004 RMB, 2005 WL 1705080, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 
2005) (contract provided that “[i]n the event that the Dominican Republic should ratify the New 
York Convention . . . the parties agree to settle their disputes via international arbitration”); L & R 
Farm P’ship v. Cargill Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 798 (W.D. Tenn. 2013) (federal statute required 
commodity traders under options contracts to make certain pre-dispute arbitration disclosures; 
compliance “is a question to be decided by the court and not an arbitrator because it concerns the 
validity of the arbitration agreement itself”). 
  In BG Group itself, the proper lawyerly argument would have started with the structure of the 
BIT itself—which first requires that “disputes with regard to an investment” “shall be submitted” to 
the local courts—and only in a later section imposes an obligation to arbitrate “the aforementioned 
disputes” after the passage of eighteen months.  See BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1220 (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added).  Might the italicized phrase refer only to those disputes that, as 
required, had first been submitted to the Argentina courts?  (Or more broadly to any “disputes with 
regard to an investment?”) 
 48. E.g., Obering v. Swain-Roach Lumber Co., 155 N.E. 712, 713 (Ind. Ct. App. 1927) (“[I]n the 
event [Seller] buys Tract No. 1,” Seller “agrees to sell [it]” to the Buyer.  The court didn’t say this, 
but the proper inference is that Buyer has no right to repudiate or withdraw within the specified time, 
although of course he need not go through with the sale unless the “condition” is triggered.). 
 49. This is conventionally distinguished from a duty that is triggered by the simple lapse of 
time—not a “condition” in the usual sense if only because, dependent on the laws of the universe 
and not on party behavior or even human will, it is certain to happen eventually.  
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resolves in itself the question of decision-making authority.  How far did that 
consent extend?  If the agreement imposes some sort of “condition,” who 
decides whether it has been fulfilled or excused?  Does this amount to a 
question of arbitral “jurisdiction”? 
Justice Breyer wrote as if it were sufficient merely to characterize local-
litigation as a “purely procedural” “claims processing” requirement.  For, he 
said, the requirement “determines when the contractual duty to arbitrate 
arises, not whether there is a contractual duty to arbitrate at all.”50  But his 
belief in the adequacy of this tendentious and manipulable terminology—
which is hardly self-defining—must seem quaint.51  It should not require too 
strong an infusion of “Legal Realism” for us to perceive that the 
“procedural” catchword is devoid of any explanatory power whatsoever.52 
For surely it is a familiar point that just about every conceivable 
objection to arbitration can be framed as implicating arbitral “jurisdiction,” 
in the sense that it potentially qualifies the nature and extent of party 
agreement. 
 Claiming that a given dispute is not “covered” by an arbitration 
clause is conventionally treated as a challenge to be resolved by a 
 
 50. BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1207.  The “claims processing” trope was repeated by the Court three 
times in the course of its short opinion—the term “procedural,” a total of 13 times.  
 51. The variant formula of “procedural arbitrability” is often invoked to explain cases like 
Howsam—and BG Group—to the point indeed of seeing it as the key to unlocking all these 
decisions.  See John James Barceló III, Substantive and Procedural Arbitrability in Ad Hoc Investor-
State Arbitration—BG Group v. Argentina, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 355, 360, 362 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2015) (“All these and 
similar preconditions represent ‘claims selecting rules’ not preconditions to the formation or validity 
or scope of the arbitration agreement[;] . . . [t]hese issues thus have a ’procedural’ cast.”). 
   But as I have asked with respect to the “procedural arbitrability” formula: “Who could 
possibly think that linking together these two words—each with a troubled history and each 
notoriously manipulatable and vague—is calculated to increase intelligibility?”  Rau, Arbitrability 
Question, supra note 7, at 322. 
 52. Another illustration: Article III of the New York Convention subjects the duty to enforce 
foreign awards to a state’s “rules of procedure.”  Does this permit a court to dismiss a motion to 
confirm on the ground of forum non conveniens?  The Restatement assumes the answer must be 
“no,” for, in language strikingly anticipating Justice Breyer’s formulation, forum non conveniens is 
not a “rule of procedure” because it “does not address how litigation shall proceed, but whether it 
shall proceed.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 
supra note 43, § 4-29.  For a more skeptical view, see Alan Scott Rau, The Errors of Comity: Forum 
Non Conveniens Returns to the Second Circuit, 23 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 7–9 (2012) (But after all, 
access to any forum may permanently be foreclosed “by any number of ‘minor matters’ or 
‘enforcement modalities’ that live in the vicinity of the fraught boundary between ‘substance’ and 
‘procedure.’”). 
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court—despite an undoubted existing agreement to arbitrate 
something.53   
 Similarly, challenges concerning the appropriate parties to the 
proceeding—“just who” is one obligated to arbitrate with?—are 
typically treated in the same fashion.54 
 Could a party to an agreement really have agreed to arbitrate a 
dispute that had already been the subject of a prior and binding 
judgment?  Or a prior and binding arbitration?55   
 Does an agreement purporting to eliminate a claimant’s right to 
recover consequential or punitive damages act as a limit on the 
decision-making authority of the arbitrators—or as a mere 
instruction to them as to how they should go about doing their 
job?56 
 A BIT may condition treaty protection on the claimant’s having 
“made and carried out” the investment “in accordance with the laws 
of the host state”: Do allegations of a claimant’s “irregular and 
fraudulent behavior” then impair the very “jurisdiction” of the 
tribunal?57 
 Then there is the familiar case where a contract requires claims to 
 
 53. See, e.g., Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 30 (Eng.) (“arbitral tribunal may rule on its own 
substantive jurisdiction, that is, as to . . . what matters have been submitted to arbitration in 
accordance with the arbitration agreement”—subject to “challenge” “in accordance with the 
provision of this Part”).  See generally Rau, supra note 6, at 95–102 (with an extended argument to 
the contrary).   
  So yes, the received wisdom universally and dogmatically repeats that “the coverage of the 
arbitration clause is presumptively a matter for final determination by the court.”  Still, I have never 
quite understood how that notion could satisfactorily be squared with the Court’s decision in 
PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 401 (2003).  See id. at 407 n.2 (“[W]e think 
the preliminary question whether [the contract prohibits an award of RICO treble damages] does not 
even amount to a question of arbitrability.”).  See generally Rau, supra note 3, at 537–39 nn.107–10. 
 54. See Rau, supra note 6, at 108–35 (with an extended argument to the contrary). 
 55. The Restatement suggests that the answer is “no.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW 
OF INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 43, § 2-19 cmt. c (“allowing courts to determine 
that a new claim for which arbitration is sought is precluded by an existing award” (emphasis 
added)). 
 56. See id. § 4-14 cmt. c (“as a default interpretation, . . . a contractual limitation on remedies but 
not a specific restriction on the tribunal’s authority”). 
 57. Teinver S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID ARB/09/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 330 (Dec. 
21, 2012) (rejecting challenge, in a “decision on jurisdiction,” on the ground that the respondent had 
“as a factual matter” “failed to demonstrate” that claimants had committed illegalities in “acquiring 
their investment”). 
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be brought within certain time limits: A party may undoubtedly 
have “agreed” to arbitrate timely claims, but does it follow that he 
has “agreed” to arbitrate stale ones?  
 And what of the cases where a contract has interposed certain steps 
to the assertion of a claim—in the form, say, of mediation or a 
grievance procedure?58 
“In short, even an otherwise unexceptional arbitration agreement can be 
cabined about with limitations and conditions that may well be thought to go 
to the power of the arbitrator to act.”59  When do any of these limitations 
become “merely procedural?”  This inquiry differs from the superficially 
similar problem posed by “claim processing” limitations on statutory causes 
of action, for our goal here—when faced with an agreement’s inevitable 
silence—is to find the appropriate default rule with respect to the probable 
ex ante understanding of contracting parties.60 
From this perspective, the last three or four of these imagined cases are 
fairly straightforward—but they are straightforward for reasons that have 
little or no purchase with respect to our present concerns.  In those cases, for 
example: 
 To determine whether a claimant has complied with the prerequisite 
of a grievance or conciliation procedure means—if the requirement 
is to have any practical effect—that a tribunal will be called on to 
assess both the nature and dimensions of the claim and the conduct 
of the disputing parties.61   
 Similarly, to assess whether a claim is “stale” will inevitably require 
an inquiry into the underlying facts or legal theories underpinning a 
 
 58. See, e.g., Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, March 4, 2004, 2005 REV. ARB. 
143 (a mandatory conciliation procedure does not affect “le principe de compétence du tribunal 
arbitral” and is thus a “question de fond”). 
 59. Rau, supra note 45, at 207. 
 60. E.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1241, 1243 (2010) (“no civil action 
for infringement of [a] copyright . . . shall be instituted” until the work has been registered; “[w]hile 
perhaps clear in theory, the distinction between jurisdictional conditions and claim-processing rules 
can be confusing in practice”). 
 61. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 557 (1964) (whether grievance 
procedures “apply to a particular dispute” and whether they “have been followed or excused . . . 
cannot ordinarily be answered without consideration of the merits of the dispute”); Dialysis Access 
Ctr., LLC v. RMS Lifeline, Inc., 638 F.3d 367, 383 (1st Cir. 2011) (arbitrators must decide whether 
the parties “engaged in good faith negotiations”). 
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claim.62 
 An arbitral tribunal may for its own purposes deem the existence of 
a “lawful investment” to be “jurisdictional” in the limited sense that 
disposing of it as a “gateway issue,” at a preliminary stage, seems a 
rational way to proceed.  For the tribunal itself, the term need not 
have much more significance than that.63  But it hardly follows that, 
on review, a court must treat the question as “jurisdictional” in the 
more interesting sense—that is, that it may refuse deference to the 
tribunal’s findings, reviewing de novo an issue that might well be 
thought to be an element of the claim or defense.64 
 
 62. To apply an “eligibility” rule to a customer’s claim against a broker for “churning” of an 
account will require a determination as to the first transaction that allegedly “rendered the overall 
trading activity . . . excessive.”  See Rau, supra note 7, at 327–29.  The values of congruence suggest 
that in this respect, contractual “time limits” should be treated consistently with other matters clearly 
understood to be within arbitral competence, such as the claims-extinguishing effect of statutes of 
limitation.  Id. at 330.  
 63. See Teinver S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID ARB/09/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 330 
(Dec. 21, 2012); cf. Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A v. Argentine Republic, ICSID ARB/08/9, Decision on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 572 (Feb. 8, 2013) (from the tribunal’s perspective there is really 
“no a priori reason” even to enter into the “doctrinal intricacies” of the distinction between 
challenges to “jurisdiction” and to “admissibility”; both serve the threshold function of deciding 
whether “the dispute could proceed to the merits phase”).  
 64. Arguably to the contrary is Chevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 795 F.3d 200, 206 (D.C. 
Cir. 2015).  Here the court did treat the existence of a qualified “investment” as a question of 
“arbitrability”—essentially, a question of “jurisdiction”—but in any event it was able to assume, 
following the familiar line of U.S. jurisprudence, that incorporation of the UNCITRAL Rules 
constituted a “delegation” of decision-making authority over this issue to the tribunal itself.  Id. at 
207–08.  But this routine reading of commonly used international “rules” is of course just one 
alternative doctrinal device for achieving the same desired effect of deference to presumed arbitral 
competence.  See Rau, supra note 3, at 570 (Courts will “pile on,” treating as cumulative and 
mutually reinforcing:  
 the effect of institutional rules; 
 the generic “broad” arbitration clause; and  
 the claim that the matter in dispute “was presumptively a matter for the arbitrator in any 
event.”   
“It is hard to avoid the conclusion that in a case where U.S. arbitration law appropriately governs the 
agreement, the rules of arbitral institutions—however they are construed—are as likely as not to 
amount to a makeweight,” and “may be properly treated in the end as tangential to any actual 
decision.”). 
  Cf. Christoph Schreuer, Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 1 
MCGILL J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 4–5 (2014).  Here Professor Schreuer points out that arbitration 
provisions in BITs “typically refer to investments as defined in the treaty” and that the consequence 
of such a definition may be “that an investment . . . not in compliance with host State law is not 
covered by the definition of ‘investment’ and will not benefit from” treaty protection.  This is clearly 
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Framed in this way, all these questions begin very much to look as if 
they belonged to the realms of interpretation and appreciation of context 
and commercial reality—questions that arbitrators are thought particularly 
well placed to answer and which are routinely entrusted to them.65  And in 
 
true.  See also supra text accompanying note 57.  He then goes on to write “therefore, failure to 
comply with host State law has the consequence that there is no valid consent to arbitration under the 
treaty.”  Schreuer, supra, at 4–5.  As should be evident, in the context of the New York Convention 
this second sentence strikes me as a simple nonsequitur. 
 65. The principal argument of this Article is that the considerations canvassed in the text just 
above—and which explain so many of the so-called “procedural arbitrability” cases—are largely 
orthogonal to the precise problem posed in BG Group.  Nevertheless, such an assertion does need to 
be qualified, and footnotes are the place to which scruples, hesitations, and the splitting of hairs are 
naturally relegated. 
 It does seem clear enough—and this is in distinction to the canonical cases like Wiley and 
Howsam—that for a court simply to determine whether local litigation has in fact been 
filed would in itself have been a reasonably straightforward and unproblematic matter.  
See BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1223 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (“A court can assess compliance with the requirement at least as well as an 
arbitrator can.”).  
 Also, by contrast to Wiley and Howsam, it does not appear to be the case that the entire 
“arbitrability” inquiry would necessarily hinge on—would indeed logically depend on—
the very underlying substantive issues of the dispute.  See supra notes 26–27 and 
accompanying text; cf. Thomas Stipanowich, Of “Procedural Arbitrability”: The Effect 
of Noncompliance with Contract Claims Procedures, 40 S.C. L. REV. 847, 861–64 
(1989).  
 However, there was nevertheless the potential at the very least for substantial overlap.  A 
“level #3” inquiry in BG Group would still call on the appropriate decision maker—
whether court or arbitrator—to consider whether the conduct of the Argentine state in 
restricting access to its judiciary had served to excuse or render “futile” the BIT’s local-
litigation requirement.  See infra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.  And to embark on 
this task might call on him to understand and to assess some of the very same regulatory 
measures that had been separately challenged in the complaint as a violation of the 
substantive provisions of the BIT.  See BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, Final 
Award, ¶¶ 156, 309 (UNCITRAL Arbitral Trib. 2007), 
http://www.italaw.com/documents/BG-award_000.pdf (Argentina “restrict[ed] the 
effectiveness of domestic judicial remedies as a means to achieve the full implementation 
of the Emergency Law” converting dollar-denominated tariffs into pesos; also, 
“Argentina enhanced the violation of the standard of fair and equitable treatment under 
the BIT by [excluding] from the imposed renegotiation process any licensee that sought 
redress in an arbitral or other forum” (emphasis added)).  So in this oblique way, the 
concerns expressed in the text above may perhaps become relevant—although at best this 
must be considered relevance “with an embarrassed look,” being not entirely “able to 
explain how it got there.” (The reference here is to Mark Twain’s delightful pillorying of 
the “literary offenses of James Fenimore Cooper”; his essay is reproduced in Mark 
Twain, Fenimore Cooper’s Literary Offenses, in THE COMIC TRADITION IN AMERICA: 
AN ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN HUMOR 328, 338 (Kenneth S. Lynn ed., 1958).) 
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the same vein—in the same effort to identify matters as to which arbitral 
tribunals have some comparative advantage—we might include “conditions” 
imposed for the purpose of ensuring rational fact-finding and efficient 
organization—“conditions,” for example, requiring a claim to be set out “in 
reasonable detail” or argument to be preceded by an exchange of 
documents.66 
A more elegant route to the same destination might start by asking why 
these “conditions” were inserted into the contract in the first place.  For 
example, could it have been thought that when a contractual time limit has 
passed, or a claimant has failed to trigger a grievance procedure, the dispute 
then suddenly and automatically becomes suitable for litigation?  No, the 
term was presumably intended to ensure that the claim would be barred “in 
whatever forum it may be asserted, arbitral or judicial.”67  And the parties 
 
 66. E.g., JPD, Inc. v. Chronimed Holdings, Inc., 539 F.3d 388, 392 (6th Cir. 2008) (unsuccessful 
attempt to argue that the failure to “thoroughly document” a claim was a failure to satisfy a 
contractual precondition to arbitration); Humitech Dev. Corp. v. Perlman, 424 S.W.3d 782, 793 
(Tex. App. 2014) (unsuccessful attempt to argue that the tribunal’s failure to follow institutional 
rules for the exchange of documents deprived it of “authority to hear the case”).  
  To the same effect is Alexis Mourre et Priscille Pedone, Compétence et recevabilité: vers la 
révision au fond?, 3 LES CAHIERS DE L’ARBITRAGE 579 (criticizing the decision of the Cour d’appel 
of Paris in Jnah Development v. Marriott International Hotels from December 17, 2013).  Here, the 
question posed to the arbitral tribunal was whether a party “was duly represented in the arbitration,” 
an award to the effect that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction was annulled by the Cour d’appel; 
however, despite the way that both the tribunal and the court had treated the question, this “clearly 
posed a question of admissibility” that should thus “have remained out of [the] control” of the court.  
The argument in the text disposes of BG Group’s rhetorical flight of fancy that Argentina’s position 
would logically give power to courts to monitor compliance with a contractual requirement for 
filings to be made on “blue paper.”  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 38, at *21, *24. 
 67. Rau, supra note 45, at 173.  Unless the provision itself can be challenged and overturned by a 
court on conventional “contract-law” grounds, for example by relying on interpretation, estoppel, or 
a preference against forfeiture.  Cf. Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 12(3) (Eng.). 
  Recall that the contract in Howsam had made “eligible” for arbitration only disputes that had 
arisen during the previous six years.  Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 81 
(2002).  Justice Breyer in BG Group relied heavily on Howsam.  See BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1207 
(like Howsam, this is a provision of the “procedural variety,” determining “when the contractual duty 
to arbitrate arises, not whether there is a contractual duty to arbitrate at all”).  But this seems fatally 
inapt.  For if one asks the critical question, “just what was this supposed condition supposed to 
qualify, anyway?,” the answer in Howsam would have to be, “it was a condition to the defendant’s 
ultimate liability”—a very different question indeed from anything “forum related.”  The staleness of 
the claim did not indeed go “to the merits” in the limited sense that it would call for an assessment of 
the wrongful nature of the defendant’s conduct, but it certainly did in the sense that a finding to the 
effect that the stipulated time had passed would bar the claim with res judicata effect for the future. 
  For this reason, the Court in Howsam correctly held that the six-year period was not to be 
[Vol. XX: N, 201x] BG Group and “Conditions” to Arbitral Jurisdiction 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
120 
presumably preferred that “whether the claim survives at all” would be a 
matter for their tribunal to decide.68  This is the thrust of Jan Paulsson’s 
powerful and seminal essays on the subject: that a term qualifies the 
“jurisdiction” of a tribunal if the intended effect of a successful challenge 
would be to send the dispute to some alternative competent forum, such as a 
court—in that sense, the challenge is “forum dependent.”
69
  But if the 
intended effect is instead that the claim “should not be heard at all (or at 
least not yet),” it is not forum dependent.70 
 
deemed “jurisdictional.”  537 U.S. at 81.  For the same reason, by the way, the suggestion that “a 
finding of inadmissibility”—unlike one with respect to jurisdiction—may “not become res judicata” 
because such defects “usually involve more transient circumstances”—that is, that they “are often 
temporary and may be cured”—is simply wrong.  Cf. Waibel, supra note 13, at 65, 70.  At least the 
argument here, and the teaching of Howsam, is precisely to the contrary. 
 68. With particular respect to a requirement of mediation, see Anne Véronique Schlaepfer, 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility: A Subtle Distinction, Not Always Easy to Make in International 
Arbitration, 2 LES CAHIERS DE L’ARBITRAGE 327, 331 (2013).  This rather misses the point too.  A 
respondent’s objection will not be that mediation is itself an “alternative forum” with “jurisdictional 
power”—of course it’s not.  The objection is instead that: 
 since mediation “conditioned” the parties’ willingness to submit to arbitral jurisdiction in 
the first place, then 
  they should now be placed in the same position they would have been in from the very 
beginning—that is, able to seize a competent state tribunal (which is an alternative 
forum). 
  This would at least be a logically coherent position.  But it seems highly implausible—that is, 
it seems unlikely that the parties’ intention was that a failure to mediate would open the doors to 
immediate litigation.  (At least not in the absence of some particularly explicit drafting—we are 
always after all in the domain of default rules informed by common intuition.)  That such a reading 
is unlikely is precisely the reason why in the case posited, the respondent’s “level #3” argument will 
fail at the outset as frivolous.  N-Tron Corp. v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., reminds us that a 
contractual obligation to engage in mediation prior to litigation presents no choice between 
alternative fora and does not call on us to make a choice between alternative decision makers.  N-
Tron Corp. v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., No. 09-0733-WS-C, 2010 WL 653760, at *3–5 (S.D. Ala. 
Feb. 18, 2010) (the parties had an obligation to “attempt in good faith to settle the dispute by non-
binding third-party mediation,” and “[a]ny dispute not so resolved by negotiation or mediation may 
then be submitted to a court of competent jurisdiction”; the failure to comply with this provision is 
not “an omission of jurisdictional proportions”). 
 69. See generally JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION (2013). 
 70. Id. at 82–90 (“[T]he success of the objection does not necessarily negate consent to the 
forum.”). 
  A telling recent illustration is Benihana, Inc. v. Benihana of Tokyo, LLC, 784 F.3d 887 (2d. 
Cir. 2015).  In a dispute arising from the termination of a license, the licensor asked for a 
preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo pending arbitration—and also a preliminary 
injunction to prevent the licensee from “arguing to the arbitral panel” for an extended period in 
which it could cure any breach.  The district court granted the injunction, noting that the agreement 
gives the licensee only a “30-day cure period,” and went on to find no “basis” in it “for a court or an 
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This approach is not, perhaps, a universal solvent71—although it does 
readily explain the results in the hypothetical cases posed previously.  But 
note that none of these functional considerations apply, or apply with 
anything like their original force, to our present case.  In BG Group, 
litigation in the judicial forum that would normally otherwise be competent 
was not only contemplated, but required; this suggests—all the obligatory 
cackle about “procedure” aside—that the challenge should be deemed 
“jurisdictional” in the accepted sense that it was forum-dependent.72  At least 
the primacy of the alternative judicial forum was mandated for the first 
eighteen months.73  The whole point of giving priority to “courts otherwise 
competent” would be eluded if an arbitrator may rule definitively that the 
 
arbitrator to extend that period”—the licensor would be “irreparably harmed” if the licensee 
“somehow wrongly convinced the arbitrators to grant it a further cure period despite its material 
breach warranting termination.”  This was obviously a reversible error.  For the licensor’s argument 
that “the issue of an extended cure period is outside the scope of the agreement to arbitrate” concerns 
“the proper interpretation of the Agreement—not who may reach it”; as an assertion “that the 
remedy cannot be granted by either a court or an arbitrator” it was at bottom just “a merits 
argument masked as a jurisdictional one.”  Id. at 899. 
 71. For example, arguments of “waiver” are regularly left to arbitrators—even though the 
“underlying assumption must be that a party who has ‘waived’ the right to arbitrate—who is found 
to have acted in a manner inconsistent with the desire to pursue arbitration—is not entirely without a 
remedy, but is merely forced back into the [alternative forum of the] courtroom.”  Rau, supra note 6, 
at 138–39.  
  Conversely, the analysis in supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text would suggest that 
questions of the scope or coverage of the arbitration agreement—“I agreed to arbitrate disputes over 
the sale of apples, but not over the sale of tomatoes”—are properly “jurisdictional” since the 
challenge assumes that the claim should be heard instead by an alternative competent forum—by the 
court rather than the tribunal.  This does indeed seem to be the effect of most of the positive law.  
But see PAULSSON, supra note 69, at 81 (proposing an “overarching presumption” to the effect that 
“arbitrators’ determinations as to the scope and timeliness of arbitrable claims should be presumed to 
be final”); supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 72. Again, what distinguishes a case like Howsam is that there would be no plausible alternative 
competent forum.  See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 73. In judging the presence of “consent” to any forum, surely the assessment is not to be simply 
made in the abstract—as a matter of “principle”—on an all-or-nothing basis—and without admitting 
the possibility that a party’s very consent to arbitration might be temporarily limited?  That would 
seem an unnecessarily partial and simplistic view of the question.  But cf. Solomon Ebere & Blerina 
Xheraj, Who Decides Arbitrability Where a Precondition to Arbitration Has Not Been Satisfied?: A 
Comment on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision to Hear the Appeal in BG Group v. Argentina, 31 J. 
INT’L ARB. 101–09 (2014) (“[P]reconditions to arbitration do not speak to the consent of the parties 
to arbitrate”—they “pertain to the arbitral process, not the fundamental question of the existence or 
validity of an arbitration agreement.”).  But the canonical tests of “existence or validity” are only 
ever important in the first place because they test (but not with any exhaustiveness) whether the 
parties have ever agreed to submit to an arbitral determination. 
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duty to seize those courts had been excused.74 
The preceding discussion will be met with a predictable objection:  
But you are treating the BIT’s local-litigation requirement as 
equivalent to an ordinary choice of forum.  And this is clearly 
incorrect: For under the terms of the treaty, the Argentine courts 
had no “power to do anything at all.”  Since “going and sitting 
can’t have any effect on the case whatsoever,” then whatever 
happens, there are no circumstances in which the parties would 
not end up in arbitration anyway.75 
One problem with this objection is that it treats the local-litigation 
requirement in an unnecessarily reductive and binary fashion.  The 
enterprise we are engaged in is not, remember, the search for an accurate 
definition, but the search for an appropriate default rule to reflect 
hypothetical intention.76  Before a sovereign state is willing to subject itself 
 
 74. Of course, the treaty reference is to the courts of Argentina, while the “level #3” question 
poses a choice between the decision-making authority of the arbitral tribunal and the courts of the 
seat.  So it may be overreaching to blandly assert—as did the Court of Appeals—that since “the 
gateway provision itself is resort to a court, the parties [should not] have been surprised to have a 
court, [rather than] an arbitrator, decide” whether it should be applied.  See Republic of Argentina v. 
BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled by 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014).  For this 
does obviously elide the fact that we are after all talking about two different judicial systems.  And so 
the court’s formulation certainly lends itself to misunderstanding.  Cf. Andrea K. Bjorklund, Case 
Comment: Republic of Argentina v. BG Group PLC, 27 ICSID REV. 4, 6 (2012) (“This sentence has 
resulted in a good bit of mischief.”).  But the BIT at least suggests a party preference that any future 
disputes not be entirely severed from the normal litigation process—the contracting parties 
themselves “specifically desired the delay attendant upon judicial proceedings preliminary to 
arbitration.” BG Grp., 665 F.3d at 1372 (citing Wiley v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 558 (1964)).  And 
so the fault, if there is one, seems venial.  
 75. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 38, at *10–11, *18 (“whatever [the local courts] 
do, it makes no difference”); see also BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1211 
(2014) (“the something [claimant] must do has no direct impact on the resolution of their dispute”).  
Recall that under the treaty, arbitration is possible even if the courts have rendered a “final decision” 
but “the Parties are still in dispute.”  See U.K.-Arg. BIT, supra note 14, at art. 2(a)(ii).   
 76. In general, on the “search for hypothetical intention,” see supra notes 6–12 and 
accompanying text. 
  I have been struck by the uniform and relentless assumption throughout the investment 
community to the effect that, somehow, the sole key to the murky mystery of proper treaty 
construction must be found in the Vienna Convention (VCLT).  See, e.g., David S. Jonas & Thomas 
N. Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods, 43 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 565 (2010).  I find this syndrome disconcerting.  The manipulable truisms of articles 
31 and 32 of the Convention are certainly inoffensive enough.  See MICHAEL WAIBEL, UNIFORMITY 
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VERSUS SPECIALISATION: A UNIFORM REGIME OF TREATY INTERPRETATION? 4–5 (2013), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2353833 (referring to the VCLT standards as a 
“lowest common denominator,” operating “at a high level of generality” and containing “obvious” 
“principles of logic and good sense”). 
  But I may perhaps be forgiven, as an erstwhile teacher of Contracts, for thinking that 
everything is already present in the familiar corpus of private law.  Every “bargain,” after all, poses a 
problem of the coordination of possibly adverse interests in the view of achieving an integrative 
solution.  At a later point, however, A may allege that B has limited his freedom of action in a 
particular way, an allegation that B vigorously denies.  The methodology is familiar: the principal 
route to a solution is to ask whether, in light of the situation of the parties at the time of contracting, 
A would be reasonable in so believing, and whether B should reasonably have appreciated A’s 
expectations.  The inquiry is of course always fact-intensive—but if this is the well-trodden path 
down which the Convention directs us, the trail has been marked with equal clarity by the 
Restatement of Contracts.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 40, § 201 cmt. 
b (“the context relevant to interpretation of a bargain is the context common to both parties”); id. § 
202(1)–(2) & cmt. e (“if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great weight”; 
“where language has a generally prevailing meaning it is interpreted” accordingly; but “general 
usage” may “yield to internal indications such as inconsistency [or] absurdity”).  The meaning of the 
BIT is thus “to be ascertained by the same rules of construction and course of reasoning which we 
apply to the interpretation of private contracts.”  Cf. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN 
LAW 174 (Jon Roland ed., 2002).  In both cases, the work of construction is to attribute “meaning” to 
a given text—although strictly speaking, of course, words themselves have no “meaning”—only 
people do. 
  Naturally, no claim is being made that these instruments, the VCLT and Restatement, operate 
in an identical fashion.  While “the interpretation tools are comparable and so are the approaches,” it 
is concededly true that in investment cases (unlike contract cases) “only one of the drafters [will be] 
present” in the arbitration “to explain” his understanding and intentions.  Gabrielle Kaufmann-
Kohler, Interpretation of Treaties: How Do Arbitral Tribunals Interpret Dispute Settlement 
Provisions Embodied in Investment Treaties, in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 257, 260–61 (Loukas Mistelis & Juliam D.M. Lew eds., 2006).  But there seems to be 
little significance in this fact since in any event, and in either case, any purely subjective element in 
interpretation will be necessarily minimized.  And while both instruments appeal to the need to 
understand “context,” the term is concededly used in different senses.  In ordinary contract law, after 
all, “everything is context.”  “A sentence is never not in a context.  We are never not in a situation . . 
. [where a] sentence that seems to need no interpretation is already the product of one.”  Stanley E. 
Fish, Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the 
Obvious, What Goes Without Saying, and Other Special Cases, 4 CRITICAL INQUIRY 625, 634, 637 
(1978).  By contrast, reference to “context” assumes a different significance in the VCLT.  See 
Hrvatska Elektroprivreda D.D. v. Republic of Slovn., ICSID No. ARB/05/24, Individual Opinion of 
Jan Paulsson, ¶ 44 (June 12, 2009); J. ROMESH WEERAMANTRY, TREATY INTERPRETATION IN 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 62 (2012).  But again, the fact that one is at the same time encouraged to 
invoke a treaty’s “object and purposes” or the “circumstances of [its] conclusion” can go a long way 
towards bridging any gap.  See Thomas W. Wälde, Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences 
and Examples, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR 
OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 724, 754 n.106 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009).   
  The claim that is being made here, though, is that any such differences do not as a practical 
matter affect the concrete question posed in BG Group—and thus that to privilege the Convention as 
some sort of touchstone uniquely leading us to an answer seems unnecessary and misguided.  See, 
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to a binding award by private individuals, might it not have plausibly 
insisted on reserving an opportunity—if only briefly and in the first 
instance—for its local tribunals to consider and address challenges to the 
regulatory regime?77  Whatever importance Argentina may have attributed to 
this eighteen-month hiatus,78 the state would certainly have found it 
paradoxical that the critical question—whether the requirement had been 
satisfied—should be submitted for a final determination by the very tribunal 
whose decision it was attempting to defer to. 
More fundamentally, it does not seem fair to treat the BIT’s local-
litigation requirement entirely as an empty, formal ritual without operative 
significance: 
 If the Argentine courts had been seized, they were likely to have 
grappled with any number of municipal law issues on which final 
resolution of an investment dispute might turn.  Imagine, for 
example, the relevance of the authority of an agent, the proper 
observance of corporate formalities, the duration of a license, or the 
 
e.g., Republic of Ecuador v. Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co., [2005] EWHC (QB) 774 [62]–[63] 
(Eng.) (as “there is no doubt” that the BIT is “governed by public international law,” “[i]t would be 
logical” that the jurisdiction of the arbitrators [“i.e., the scope of the arbitration agreement”], was 
“governed by the same law”), aff’d, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1116 [¶ 13] (“although neither side 
suggests that the answer is crucial to its own case”). 
 77. The mandate to consider “object and purpose” should presumably be read to refer to the 
“object and purpose” of the contested provision being litigated.  See, e.g., Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A v. 
Argentine Republic, ICSID ARB/08/9, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 602 (Feb. 8, 
2013) (“serv[ing] the purpose of honoring the host State’s sovereignty” by providing it “the 
opportunity to review—and if appropriate, to correct—government acts before setting in motion the 
intricacies and consequences associated with international investment arbitration”).  Compare the 
highly nuanced discussion of Wälde, supra note 76, at 764 & n.135  (“the reference to the overall 
purpose(s) of a treaty needs to be complemented by an investigation of the specific purpose of a 
particular treaty mechanism and concept”; “the focus on specific provisions, their function, and 
interaction is much more ‘technical’ and thus less problematic”).  To stress, by contrast, the 
“protective purpose of the treaty” as a whole—the global “promotion” of investments—seems 
tendentious and calculated to lead ineluctably to a decision in favor of the claimant.  Cf. infra notes 
159, 210 and accompanying text; Jason Webb Yackee, Do States Bargain over Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement?, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 277, 290–91 (2013) (dispute-settlement clauses 
“can be controversial, and States can, and sometimes do, specifically negotiate over” them, for 
example by “marginally weakening model” texts).  This further suggests that, given our limited 
task—that of creating a presumption to identify the appropriate decisionmaker—a view of the local-
litigation requirement as merely “trivial,” a “historical vestige” “serv[ing] virtually no purpose,” may 
be somewhat superficial.  Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 38, at *34–35 (Alito, J.). 
 78. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 38, at *11 (counsel for BG Group stating, “I’ll 
give them that it’s important; they negotiated for it”). 
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construction of Argentine legislation.  Their judgment—even if 
denied actual preclusive effect—must at the very least inform any 
later award by an arbitral tribunal; it would, if only as a source of 
“data” with regard to mixed questions of fact and law, properly 
command considerable deference.79 
 If the Argentine courts had been seized, they might conceivably 
have gone on to render a judgment in favor of the claimant (either 
on the basis of local law or, if they could, for violation of the BIT 
itself).  In such a case it seems implausible to imagine a scenario in 
which it is now the state that seeks to convene an arbitral tribunal 
for the purpose of having the decision of its own courts reversed.80 
 Chief Justice Roberts in his dissenting opinion made the further 
point that if the Argentine courts had been seized, any decision on 
their part would at the least “help to narrow the range of issues that 
remain in controversy,” perhaps even serving to “induce” a 
 
 79. E.g., Emmis Int’l Holdings, B.V. v. Hungary, ICSID No. ARB/12/2, Award, ¶¶ 174–75 (Apr. 
16, 2014) (“Where the Tribunal is presented with a question of municipal law essential . . . [to 
establish jurisdiction, such as the existence or ownership of a covered investment], the Tribunal, 
whilst retaining its independent powers of assessment and decision, must seek to determine the 
content of the applicable law in accordance with evidence presented to it as to the content of the law 
and the manner in which the law would be understood and applied by municipal courts.”); Soufraki 
v. United Arab Emirates, ICSID No. ARB/02/7, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee On the 
Application For Annulment of Mr. Soufraki, ¶ 96 (June 5, 2007) (“[W]hen applying national law, an 
international tribunal must strive to apply the legal provisions as interpreted by the competent 
judicial authorities[;] . . . it is Italian law, as applied in Italy, that really constitutes Italian law.”); cf. 
Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, LCIA No. UN 3467, ¶ 58 (July 1, 2004) (“[T]he 
decisions adopted thus far by Ecuadorian courts on matters of interpretation of the Ecuadorian Tax 
Law have been of great help to this Tribunal in its own interpretation” of the Treaty); id. ¶ 137 
(perhaps not “precedent having either binding or mandatory force as regards the instant case,” but as 
“useful guidance in understanding Ecuadorian legislation”). 
  In the BG Group case itself, see BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, Final Award, ¶¶ 
119–20 (UNCITRAL Arbitral Tribunal, 2007) (question whether claimant’s rights, including the 
license granted to its subsidiary, constituted a protected “asset” or “active”; “in the absence of a 
statutory definition, the Tribunal must turn to the interpretive work of the [Argentine] courts”).  
 80. See BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1221 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (if the claimant prevailed, this 
“could . . . obviate the need for arbitration”); cf. Ambiente Ufficio S.p.A, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, ¶ 605 (eighteen months “may indeed be sufficient . . . for the national courts to render 
a first-instance judgment in the investor’s favour which the host State does not appeal”).  At oral 
argument, counsel for BG Group gamely suggested that in the event of an adverse judgment, 
Argentina too could initiate arbitration.  See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 38, at *19.  
This rhetorical move was unlikely to have been made seriously.  Cf. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 
33, at *48 (litigation has no “legal significance . . . if the aggrieved investor in any way disagrees 
with the conclusions of the local courts”).   
[Vol. XX: N, 201x] BG Group and “Conditions” to Arbitral Jurisdiction 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
126 
settlement short of a protracted arbitral proceeding—yet another 
reason to treat the BIT requirement as meaningful.
81
 
Concededly, precisely the same thing might be said with regard to any 
number of “procedural conditions” such as mediation.  But just as some 
settlement devices that are stipulated to be non-binding may nevertheless 
come within the gravitational pull of the Federal Arbitration Act—and thus 
permit a party to invoke the statute82—so too will litigation that does not in 
all circumstances lead to a binding judgment may, for some purposes, fall 
within our understanding of what a forum selection clause may be.  That the 
award or judgment may not be universally preclusive is not the question—
nor is the question whether this satisfies some ideal a priori definition of 
what a particular forum “must look like.”  The question, rather, is whether 
there is sufficient similarity to the modal case to implicate some of the same 
policies and to justify equivalent treatment. 
Assume an agreement calls for arbitration in Freedonia, but specifies 
“there shall be no right to arbitrate until the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Freedonia has ruled [one way or the other] on the question whether the 
dispute is capable of being arbitrated under local law.”  Should the 
arbitrators assume jurisdiction without waiting for such a ruling, I doubt 
their award should be confirmed.  A ruling by Freedonian courts that the 
dispute is (as we say in the U.S.) “inarbitrable” would, here also, not be 
universally binding—it would not necessarily bar an arbitration from 
proceeding nor an award being rendered that could be enforced elsewhere.  
But that a local judgment would not be conclusive for all purposes does not 
prevent us from appreciating that the parties might still have preferred—as a 
matter of efficiency or to enable them to orient their conduct—that the case 
nevertheless be heard there before the expense of arbitration is incurred.  If 
one can imagine a possible scenario in which the parties did in fact make 
this defensible choice, how much more explicit does the language have to 
be? 
In summary, then: Despite the ultimate outcome, there seems much to 
be said in favor of the original “level #3” decision of the Court of Appeals.  
That approach would still leave us well short of all the imaginary horribles, 
 
 81. BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1221 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 82. Alan Scott Rau, The Culture of American Arbitration and the Lessons of ADR, 40 TEX. INT’L 
L.J. 449, 467–68 (2005) (“non-binding arbitration” as within the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)); see 
id. at 503 (treating the arbitration statute “as subject to a process of dynamic growth,” asking in 
particular cases “to what extent the goals of the statutory mechanism are being served”). 
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such as the “disruption of the established” arbitral system, raised by amici—
for the case would not have ended there.83 
Having decided at “level #3” that compliance with the local-litigation 
requirement was a matter of “jurisdiction”—as to which the tribunal’s 
determination was entitled to no deference at all—the court would then 
normally have proceeded at “level #2” to decide de novo the actual existence 
of arbitral authority.84  Here is really where the Court of Appeals went 
astray.  The court—rather than summarily dismissing jurisdiction on the 
basis of some naïve notion of the text’s “plain meaning”—could have 
conducted (or remanded to the trial court to conduct) an inquiry into whether 
the requirement should be deemed excused.  I suspect a proper analysis—
parallel to that of the tribunal itself—would have reached the same result, 
either on ordinary contract grounds or by invoking the notion of “futility.”85  
If it had, the arbitral award on the merits would still be confirmed.  After all, 
an argument about whether the requirement is still in place does not 
necessarily implicate the identity of the appropriate decision maker.  This is 
a distinction that, however frequently people miss it, is a fault line that runs 
through all of our law of arbitration.86 
 
 83. Brief of Professors and Practitioners, supra note 24, at *1. 
 84. Nothing in the argument in supra note 83 and infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text is in 
the slightest degree inconsistent with the notion that the jurisdictional point could—and indeed 
should—nevertheless have been argued as a preliminary matter before the arbitral tribunal itself 
once it had been constituted.  This was an unremarkable point made by counsel for Argentina in oral 
argument (“if there was a judge’s strike, so none of the courts were operating,” then “there would be 
a very strong case to be made to the arbitrators”)—and so Justice Kennedy’s attempt at ridicule 
(“your whole argument gives me intellectual whiplash. . . . (Laughter.)”)—while eminently 
quotable—was unfair and, what is worse, completely beside the point.  Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 38, at *52–53.  In First Options, Mr. Kaplan, too, had urged the tribunal to find that he 
was not a party to an enforceable arbitration agreement, but the teaching of the case is that, at the 
end of the day, the definitive decision would still be made by a court.   
  For the same reason, BG Group’s argument that Argentina should have been expected to 
forestall the whole problem, by attempting as soon as possible to enjoin the ongoing arbitral 
proceeding, was a clear non-starter—precisely the same thing having been futilely argued in First 
Options.  See Rau, Arbitrability Question, supra note 7, at 300 (“claimant First Options had 
repeatedly asserted that this was the course Kaplan should have been expected to take—and the 
Court seemed appalled by the implications”).  These are hardly the incentives that one would wish to 
create.  But cf. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 33, at *56–57. 
 85. For the arbitral award in this case, see supra note 19 and accompanying text.  For ordinary 
Contract learning, see CORBIN, supra note 44, § 40.17 (“elimination of a condition” when defendant 
“unjustly prevents [its] fulfillment”).  
 86. See Tribunal fédérale [TF] [federal tribunal] July 7, 2014, 4A_124/2014 (Switz.).  The 
dispute resolution scheme designed by the parties for this private contract actually seems closely 
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If that’s all there is, then one would be tempted to sum up the BG Group 
case by saying, after La Fontaine, that “de loin, c’est quelque chose; et de 
près, ce n’est rien.”87  Granted, the performance of the Court of Appeals 
gives little reason to be uniformly sanguine about the consequences of 
trusting the federal judiciary.  But then that is what hierarchically superior 
courts are for.88 
E. Allocating Authority by Contract and the Dilemma of Institutional Rules 
There is one final point.  Given the perspective from which the Court 
viewed the case, it turned out to be unnecessary to actually address this point 
in BG Group itself—but since things could well (and should) have turned 
out somewhat differently, a brief discussion seems warranted. 
Assume that the alternative analysis I have suggested in Part D above 
 
analogous to what is mandated by the U.K.-Argentina BIT.  As provided in the FIDIC’s “Red Book” 
for standard engineering contracts, disputes between the contracting parties “shall be adjudicated” by 
a “dispute adjudication board”—whose “decision shall be binding”—except that “if either Party is 
dissatisfied” with it, an arbitration may be initiated.  The court first found this “precondition” to be 
“mandatory”—which seemed to imply that the party seeking annulment had raised a “jurisdictional 
defense” which would be reviewed de novo by the court (since noncompliance with the condition 
“must . . . be sanctioned one way or the other”).  Id. ¶ 3.2.  Note that under the contract, the board’s 
decision was to be effective and bind the parties unless and until the arbitrators overturned it—it 
would not be a completely empty dead letter.  Nevertheless the court went on to make—by itself—
the determination that the condition had been excused.  The parties were “irreconcilable,” so that 
going through the procedure would have served no purpose; the respondent, who had filed the 
request for arbitration, could hardly be “blame[d] . . . for losing patience and finally skipping the 
DAB phase.”  Id. ¶ 3.5.  So on that ground, the court was able to refuse annulment even without 
extending any deference to the tribunal’s decision.  That, one might think, is an approach that might 
well have served as a template for the Court in BG Group. 
  For another illustration, see Tribunal fédérale [TF] [federal tribunal] June 6, 2007, 
4A_18/2007 (Switz.) (“even if” a contractual provision with respect to mediation was intended to be 
binding, the failure of settlement efforts “clearly show” (démontrent) that there was “no longer any 
hope of reconciling the parties,” so that any mediation procedure would have been “doomed to 
failure”; therefore, since the claimant was thus justified in directly initiating arbitration, the motion 
to annul the award was denied).  Here too, as in the later case, the interest from our perspective is 
that it is the State court, not the arbitral tribunal, which has made this determination with regard to 
pointlessness. 
 87. JEAN DE LA FONTAINE, Le Chameau et les Bâtons flottants, in IV LES FABLES DE LA 
FONTAINE (1668) (“by far, this is something; and near, it’s nothing”). 
 88. In oral argument, Justice Kennedy, while agreeing with the Court of Appeals “as to the 
authority of the court to decide the issue,” went on to add that “[he] also think[s] that they are 
probably wrong on the merits, but [he] cannot reach that second question.”  Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 38, at *13. 
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proves convincing—that is, that compliance with the local-litigation 
requirement is something properly reserved in the normal run of things for a 
court.  But as I’ve said, everything always reduces itself ultimately to 
“agreement”—and since the allocation of power responds to the choice of 
the appropriate default rule, it is hard to see the objection to allowing the 
parties to vary the assumed baseline presumption by contract. 
This possibility of contractual re-allocation is usually thought to have 
originated in the First Options decision of the U.S. Supreme Court—where 
the Court said that the question, “who has the primary power” to decide 
questions of arbitral jurisdiction “turns”—precisely like any other discrete 
issue in dispute between the parties—on what they “agreed about that 
matter.”  If the parties “submitted” it to arbitration, “a court must defer” to 
the arbitrator’s determination.89  In later cases this principle has been 
extended even to awards determining the enforceability of the arbitration 
clause itself—if the parties have made what the Court has called a 
contractual “delegation” to the arbitrators.90 
 By contrast, the arbitrati of other states are likely to find even the 
possibility of such a re-allocation illegitimate and heretical—“exorbitant,” 
“neither logical or acceptable”91—and indeed, “scientifically false.”92  That 
 
 89. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995); Rau, supra note 82, at 464 
(“but the matter was a commonplace long before, and should always, in any event, have gone 
without saying”). 
  First Options is often taken to have held that any such contractual re-allocation of the power 
to decide jurisdictional issues must be “clear and unmistakable.”  E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 43, § 2-13(a) & cmt. c (Council 
Draft No. 4, 2014).  But I have argued earlier and at length that this whole trope of the “clear and 
unmistakable” was nothing but “one overblown latke”—with “very little purchase beyond the 
particular factual pattern faced by the Court.”  See Rau, supra note 3, at 528–39.  “[T]his whole 
notion of requiring a somehow particularly explicit consent to arbitral jurisdiction was seized on by 
Justice Breyer largely as an interpretive device, a focused response to a particular dilemma faced by 
people like Mr. Kaplan who would otherwise have to steer at their peril between the twin dangers of 
default and of being inadvertently found to have ‘submitted.’”  Id. at 535.  In other words, the 
holding was simply this: that we must be skeptical about a tribunal’s presuming to “assume 
jurisdiction over any issue merely by virtue of the fact a party has argued the matter before it.”  At 
the same time I have strenuously doubted the continuing viability of the “clear and unmistakable” 
trope in light of the Court’s later decision in PacifiCare.  See PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 
538 U.S. 401, 406–07 (2003) (whether a contractual provision that bars the award of punitive 
damages should be understood as barring the recovery of treble damages under RICO must be a 
matter for final determination by the arbitrators).  
 90. I explain and defend this result at length in Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Power and the Limits of 
Contract: The New Trilogy, 22 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 435, 488–523 (2011). 
 91. See, e.g., PHILIPPE FOUCHARD ET AL., TRAITÉ DE L’ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL 
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an arbitral tribunal could possibly be the exclusive judge of its own 
jurisdiction may even be a result that is claimed—with characteristic 
solipsism—to be “accepted nowhere.”93  To the extent I understand it, the 
objection seems to rest on some a priori notion of a “rule” of judicial review 
that is: 
 either so axiomatic, so taken for granted, so generally accepted, that 
its origin as a mere presumption—a background rule, a reversible 
“default rule”—simply does not rise to the level of consciousness; 
or  
 one that is deemed to be so inherently inalienable as to obviate any 
need even to justify the resulting interference with private 
autonomy.94 
In many ways, the central problem in any arbitration regime can be 
framed as the interplay between a given system of civil procedure and the 
agreement of the parties.  So immediately after First Options, the AAA 
revised its Arbitration Rules in an explicit attempt to take advantage of the 
space the Court had opened up.  Rule 7 now provides that the arbitral 
tribunal “shall have the power to rule on [its] own jurisdiction, including any 
objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration 
agreement”—language that we are told by the drafters was expressly 
“designed to address” the Court’s suggestion in First Options, and thus “to 
 
INTERNATIONAL 414–15 (1996). 
 92. Emmanuel Gaillard, Note, 1995 REV. ARB. 618, 621 (1995).  
 93. Id. (“une telle consequence n’est admise ni dans ce pays, ni ailleurs”).  
  Professor Mayer has characteristically given us a more nuanced view perceiving that the 
outcome should not turn on a priori doctrine but on contractual intent.  See Pierre Mayer, 
L’autonomie de l’arbitre international dans l’appréciation de sa propre competence, 25 R.C.A.D.I. 
319, 340–41 (1989). 
 94. In Johnson’s words, this would seem to be nothing more than “destroying a certain portion of 
liberty, without a good reason, which was always a bad thing.”  JAMES BOSWELL, THE LIFE OF 
SAMUEL JOHNSON 325 (Percy Fitzgerald ed., 1900). 
  Concededly, even in the U.S., one does still continue to come across the occasional bluff 
assertion that such a contractual readjustment of the FAA’s default allocation of authority between 
courts and arbitrators is somehow illegitimate—that within the structure of the statute, the power to 
determine whether a duty to arbitrate exists remains a “nondelegable judicial function”—but this is 
an argument that has certainly not improved with age.  See generally Rau, supra note 3, at 497 nn. 
214–15.  Sure, under section 4 a court must be “satisfied” that some agreement imposes the duty to 
arbitrate.  “But how much in thrall to the ‘plain meaning’ fallacy does one have to be, in order to 
deny that a court might be appropriately ‘satisfied,’ not directly, but at an earlier stage and at one 
remove—that is, after it has identified an agreement by which the parties were willing to entrust this 
determination to their agent?  Can any conceivable purpose explain such a wooden result?” 
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constitute party agreement to the arbitrability of [such] ‘jurisdictional 
disputes.’”95 
American courts have drawn the obvious inference—routinely holding 
that to arbitrate under these rules is itself a decision to confer on arbitrators 
final and unreviewable decision-making power with respect to their own 
jurisdiction.  This common way of reading the AAA Rules has now become 
something of a meta-default rule—treating a contractual reference to the 
Rules as a simple term of art denoting the choice of a particular scheme for 
the allocation of power.96 
And now we get to the real puzzler, which is this: while the intent of the 
AAA Rules is clear, no one could have had anything like that in mind when 
the facially identical rules of other arbitral institutions were drafted.  (I say 
“facially identical,” for whatever differences one can point to between the 
text of the AAA Rules and that of other familiar sets of rules, such as those 
of the ICC and UNCITRAL, are with respect to compétence-compétence 
trivial in the extreme.)97 
 
 95. See Rau, supra note 3, at 542–43. 
 96. See generally Rau, supra note 6, at 92.  But cf. NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc. v. UBS Sec., LLC, 
770 F.3d 1010, 1031–32 (2d Cir. 2014).  Here the arbitration clause contained a “carve out” making 
inarbitrable certain disputes alleging violations by NASDAQ of its self-regulatory obligations: 
“Except as may be provided in the NASDAQ OMX Requirements, all . . . matters in question 
between the Parties . . . shall be settled by final [and] binding arbitration.”  It was held that in these 
circumstances the determination of arbitral jurisdiction was for the court itself—and that 
incorporation of the AAA Rules made no difference: the “carve out” was “a circumstance that . . . 
delays application of AAA rules until a decision is made as to whether a question does or does not 
fall within the intended scope of arbitration.”  Now I very much doubt that this is a tenable line.  For 
one thing, it seems to confuse “delegation by virtue of a broad clause” with “delegation by virtue of 
a reference to institutional rules.”  Compare Rau, supra note 6, at 92–95, with id. at 90–91.  These 
are different grounds: if the clause contains a “carve out,” then the former may indeed have little 
purchase, but the latter need not be affected.  After all, a “carve out” excluding from arbitration 
anything not dealing with “the sale of fruit” need not bar AAA arbitrators from determining whether 
disputes over tomatoes or pecans are within their jurisdiction.  See supra notes 1–5 and 
accompanying text.  For the interaction of the generic “broad” clause, and the reference to 
institutional rules, compare Silec Cable S.A.S. v. Alcoa Fjardaal SF, Civil No. 12-01392, 2012 WL 
5906535, at *14 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2012) (under ICC Rules, it was for the arbitrators to determine 
whether the “claims set forth in [the] arbitration demand are arbitrable;” and “[i]n addition,” the 
“broad, unlimited and unambiguous language” used in the arbitration clause “convinces [the] Court 
that the parties intended that the arbitrator decide the scope of any claims”), with Congress 
Construction Co. v. Geer Woods, Inc., No. 3:05CV1665 (MRK), 2005 WL 3657933, at *3 (D. Conn. 
Dec. 29, 2005) (incorporation of AAA Rules “gives the arbitrators the power to decide questions of 
arbitrability,” but “[s]econd, and, in any event,” the broad language of the arbitration clause “is itself 
sufficient to permit the Court to conclude that it is for the arbitrators to decide” such questions). 
 97. However, the occasional arid semantic quibble can be expected.  E.g., Telenor Mobile 
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Of course it would betray considerable linguistic naïveté to assume that 
words or collocations of words must always carry precisely the same 
significance without regard to context.  Given the patent ambiguity of the 
words “rule” and “decide,” conflation of their very different senses is fatal to 
intelligent argument.  For it seems obvious that the rules of the ICC, for 
example, deeply rooted as they are in the premises and presuppositions of 
French procedural law, were merely meant to restate party agreement to the 
arbitrators’ chronological priority in “decision making”—and thus not 
intended in any way to amount to a final grant of authority.98  Nevertheless, 
U.S. courts,  
 ignorant of the backstory that properly informs construction of a 
text, 
 seeing arbitration primarily as an emanation of the law of Contracts, 
and 
 indulging their increasingly frequent reticence to venture beyond 
apparent “plain meaning,” 
 have regularly tended to view both the rules of the ICC99 and those of 
 
Comm. AS v. Storm LLC, 524 F. Supp. 2d 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 584 F.3d 396 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(while the AAA rules grant arbitrators the authority “to rule on [their] jurisdiction,” by contrast, the 
UNCITRAL rules “only . . . allow arbitrators to rule on objections to that authority”).   
 98. See generally Richard W. Hulbert, Institutional Rules and Arbitral Jurisdiction: When Party 
Intent Is Not “Clear and Unmistakable,” 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 545, 557–60, 570–71 (2006) 
(demonstrating that these rules could never have been intended to constitute party agreement to any 
final determination by an arbitral tribunal with respect to its own jurisdiction). 
  The new LCIA Rules make this clear in what I would have thought was a superfluous 
abundance of caution.  Article 23.1 also confers on the arbitral tribunal the “power to rule upon its 
own jurisdiction and authority, including any objection to the initial or continuing existence, validity, 
effectiveness or scope of the Arbitration Agreement.”  Arbitration Rules Art. 23.1, LONDON CT. 
INT’L ARB. (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-
2014.aspx#Article%2023.  And article 23.5 warns that by agreeing to arbitration, “after the 
formation of the Arbitral Tribunal the parties shall be treated as having agreed not to apply to any 
state court or other legal authority for any relief regarding the Arbitral Tribunal's jurisdiction or 
authority.”  Arbitration Rules Art. 23.5, LONDON CT. OF INT’L ARB. (Oct. 1, 2014), 
http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014.aspx#Article%2023.  
But then article 23.5 is immediately qualified by adding an exception—and this alone, of course, 
speaks volumes—that admits the possibility of recourse “following the [tribunal’s] award on the 
objection to its jurisdiction or authority.” 
 99. E.g., Aluminium Bahrain B.S.C. v. Dahdaleh, 17 F. Supp. 3d 461, 475 (W.D. Pa. 2014) 
(“incorporation of the ICC Rules into an arbitration agreement left arbitrability to the arbitrators,” so 
that “the scope of what claims may be arbitrated” is an “issue to be resolved by” them); Burnham 
Enters., LLC v. DACC Co., No. 2:12-CV-111-WKW, 2013 WL 68923, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 7, 
2013) (adoption of the ICC rules clearly and unmistakably evidences the parties’ intention that 
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UNCITRAL100 as a sufficient grant to arbitrators—similar in effect to the 
AAA Rules—of the power to make a binding determination of their own 
jurisdiction. 
The nagging problem in our case was that the U.K.-Argentina BIT had 
by default made the UNCITRAL Rules applicable to the arbitration.   
 The Court of Appeals was able to brush aside any possible 
significance of the Rules, having already found that any contractual 
duty on the part of the Argentine Republic was subject to the prior 
“condition” of local litigation.  Without any “consent” to arbitrate 
“yet,” it naturally followed that the Rules too (however interpreted) 
could not yet have been triggered.101 
 Amicus briefs—from the AAA, from concerned “professors and 
practitioners,” as well as from the U.S. arm of the ICC—urged that 
the UNCITRAL Rules required deference to arbitral determinations 
on jurisdiction; they relied on the claim that the “plain meaning” of 
these rules constituted a “delegation” to the arbitrators and on the 
remarkably irrelevant claim that all these bodies of rules “espouse 
the internationally accepted doctrine of competence-competence.”102 
 Given the tack taken in the majority opinion, the Supreme Court 
thought itself exempt from even having to address the question of 
“delegation” at all.
103
  For obviously an explicit re-allocation of 
 
whether “the parties agree[d] to submit this dispute to arbitration” was a question for the arbitrator). 
 100. E.g., Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 724 F.3d 1069, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(“consistent with the majority view regarding the effect of incorporating the AAA rules into an 
agreement”; “it is immaterial . . . that in some countries the arbitrator’s jurisdiction may be 
simultaneously challenged in court”); Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 395 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (BIT incorporated by reference the UNCITRAL rule “delegating questions of arbitrability 
to the arbitral panel through language nearly identical to the AAA [Rules]”). 
 101. See Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1361, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled 
by 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014). 
 102. E.g., Brief for the United States Council for International Business as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at *2, *9, *12, Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1363 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012) (No. 12-138), 2013 WL 4769420; Brief of Professors and Practitioners, supra note 24, at 
*17–18. 
 103. There is nevertheless a mysterious throwaway reference to the UNCITRAL Rules in the 
Court’s opinion.  See BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1210 (2014) (“the 
Treaty itself authorizes the use of international arbitration associations [sic], the rules of which 
provide that arbitrators shall have the authority to interpret provisions of this kind,” referring to 
ICSID and UNCITRAL).  If this is merely intended to acknowledge the “positive” function of 
compétence-compétence, it is a truism.  To attribute any greater significance to the Rules would, as 
explained in the text, seem completely orthogonal to the thrust of the overall argument.  Perhaps the 
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“jurisdictional” issues would be simply superfluous if the local-
litigation requirement wasn’t one in the first place, being (as the 
Court concluded) merely “procedural.”104 
Now for the ICC to take such a view—at least with respect to U.S. 
law—is not, despite appearances, entirely disingenuous.  Our usual working 
assumption is that the extent of arbitral power falls to be assessed by the law 
of the seat105—and the goal of any arbitral institution is presumably to draft 
up to the limits permitted by that body of law to ensure that awards benefit 
 
best account of the reference is to attribute it to the dutiful and obsessively thorough research efforts 
of a law clerk. 
 104. Cf. Ecopetrol S.A. v. Offshore Exploration & Prod. LLC, 46 F. Supp. 3d 327, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014).  Here the court characterized the BG Group holding as one in which the Court reviewed with 
“considerable deference” the tribunal’s “determination that it had jurisdiction . . . because [the] 
arbitration provision in [the] treaty committed [the] jurisdictional determination to [the] arbitrators.”  
As should be obvious from the discussion in the text, this totally misstates what BG Group was all 
about.  But as we have seen—given the obvious tendency in federal courts to rigorously presume 
arbitral competence—such a mischaracterization may not perhaps have great ultimate significance.  
See supra note 64. 
 105. But cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 
supra note 43, § 4-14(b) & cmt. b (“[W]hether a Convention award deals with matters that were not 
submitted to arbitration is determined by the law to which the parties have subjected the arbitration 
agreement.”  In the absence of an express choice, however, the default preference turns to the “law 
identified in the general choice-of-law clause in the underlying contract” rather than the law of the 
seat.).  I criticize this Restatement choice in Alan Scott Rau, Understanding (and Misunderstanding) 
“Primary Jurisdiction,” 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 47, 167–73 (2010) (“rather curious for all sorts of 
reasons”).  So does Gary Born.  See generally 1 GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 500 (2d ed. 2014) (“ill-considered”). 
  Alternatively, perhaps, to the extent that U.S. courts 
 inadvertently find themselves channeling the French jurisprudence in Dalico, or  
 completely misunderstood the implications of Mastrobuono,  
there may be recourse to some “federal law of arbitrability.”  On the former point, see François-
Xavier Train, Droit applicable à la convention d’arbitrage international, in JURISDICTIONAL 
CHOICES IN TIMES OF TROUBLE 145 (2015); on the latter, see Cape Flattery Ltd. v. Titan Maritime, 
LLC, 647 F.3d 914, 921 (9th Cir. 2011) (agreement called for arbitration in London with “English 
law and practice to apply,” but the court held that the “federal law of arbitrability,” not English law, 
determines “whether a given dispute is arbitrable in the first place”).  See also Alan Scott Rau, Out 
to Sea in the Ninth Circuit: Bungling Questions of Arbitrability, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Nov. 21, 
2011), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2011/11/21/out-to-sea-in-the-ninth-circuit-bungling-
questions-of-arbitrability/ (the court “ma[de] a complete hash” of things, confusing a vertical choice-
of-law question—the question raised by Mastrobuono—with the applicability of U.S. law in the face 
of a choice-of-law or choice-of-forum clause that leads to the law of another nation).   
  Obviously, in the circumstances of the BG Group case, both these alternatives will in any 
event amount to the same thing. 
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from the maximum possible finality.106  (In the ICC Rules, for example, the 
grant of compétence-compétence in Rule 6.5 is coupled with the provisions 
of Rule 34.6 under which the parties, by arbitrating under the Rules, are 
“deemed to have waived their right to any form of recourse insofar as such 
waiver can validly be made.”)
107
 
But I very much doubt that a “waiver of the right to seek annulment” 
amounts to quite the same thing as an agreement to entrust or “delegate” 
authority to an arbitral tribunal.108  And while a state may sometimes require 
 
 106. While the seat of the BG Group arbitration had not been chosen in the Treaty, the U.K. and 
Argentina must be taken to have understood that the validity of this New York Convention award 
would be assessed as a matter of the law of wherever the seat would happen to be—although, of 
course, First Options was at the time far in the future.  The later construction by Argentina and the 
claimant, in choosing to situate the arbitration in Washington, D.C., might have even greater 
probative value. 
 107. ICC Rules of Arbitration, INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-
services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/icc-rules-of-arbitration/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2015). 
 108. Would such a “waiver” really amount to—or would it perhaps subsume—a contractual 
agreement by which the parties delegate decision-making authority over jurisdiction to an arbitral 
tribunal? 
  Cf. 1 BORN, supra note 105, at 934 (“this misconceives what is required under First Options, 
which is evidence of an agreement to arbitrate jurisdictional issues, not a waiver of judicial review of 
arbitral decisions”). 
 On the one hand, even First Options—which in the U.S. appears to authoritatively 
sanction the latter—has never been thought to command the enforcement of blanket 
waivers of judicial review.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 43.  Compare id. § 4-24 cmt. a. (parties may 
not “agree before, during, or after the arbitral proceedings to refrain from seeking 
vacatur or resisting confirmation, recognition or enforcement of an award, or otherwise 
relinquish in advance the right to seek such relief”), with id. § 4-24 ill. 3 (although 
courts will nevertheless extend deference to “a submission agreement that 
unequivocally submits to the arbitrators all questions regarding the scope of arbitral 
jurisdiction”); Hoeft v. MVL Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Since federal 
courts are not rubber stamps, parties may not, by private agreement, relieve them of 
their obligation to review arbitration awards for compliance with § 10(a).”). 
 And in any event, even a permitted “waiver” of a party’s “right of recourse” need not 
amount to a loss of his right to resist any actual enforcement of an adverse award—or at 
least, it is most unlikely to be read as extending so far.  Cf. Decree No. 2011-48 of 13 
Jan. 2011, art. 1522 (Fr.) (the parties may by “specific agreement” “expressly waive 
their right to bring an action” for annulment, but “nonetheless retain their right to appeal 
an enforcement order” on the usual grounds set out in the statute); THOMAS CLAY, LE 
NOUVEAU DROIT FRANÇAIS DE L’ARBITRAGE 205 (2011) (the latter provision “preserves 
the parties’ right to effective recourse”). 
 On the other hand, any waiver of the right of recourse in a given jurisdiction will 
necessarily be limited in its effects to that jurisdiction alone.  By contrast, a finding at 
the seat to the effect that an arbitration clause—as construed by applicable local law—
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expressions of intention to reach a particular level of explicitness before 
permitting an award to be integrated into the local legal order—in order to 
avoid doubt and clarify matters for unwary contracting parties and reviewing 
courts109—I also very much doubt that this rule of caution is the equivalent 
of attributing an intention to parties in the first place. 
So all of this returns us ineluctably to the critical inquiry, one into the 
understandings and expectations of the contracting parties.110  Of course, as 
with any other Contracts question, the subjective intentions of the parties are 
unknowable and inconclusive.  It is commonly objected that the declared 
intentions of some institutional draftsman may not serve as a substitute—
 
has validly “delegated” certain matters to the tribunal, may be expected to command 
deference in other states as well.  Cf. 3 GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 3780, 3786–87 (2d ed. 2014).  For the U.S. practice, see AVR 
Communications, Ltd. v. American Hearing Systems, Inc., 793 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir. 
2015) (it was “impermissible” to allow respondent “to relitigate the issue of the scope of 
the arbitration clause in an American court” since “that exact issue [had already been] 
squarely addressed and rejected” by the courts at the arbitral seat).  Accord George A. 
Bermann, Domesticating the New York Convention: The Impact of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 317, 324 (2011) (“considerations of 
judicial economy suggest” that a foreign court judgment on the “scope of arbitration” 
“should be given the same preclusive effect that prior judgments generally enjoy under 
the forum’s judgment recognition policies”). 
  With respect to the immediate case, of course, recall that in any event, the UNCITRAL Rules 
at play in BG Group contain no such provision contemplating “waiver.”  See 3 BORN, supra, at 
3374. 
 109. Cf. supra note 89 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s suggestion, as to which I 
express considerable doubt, to the effect that delegations of jurisdictional authority to arbitrators 
must be “clear and unmistakable”); Tribunal fédérale [TF] [federal tribunal] July 7, 2014, 
4A_124/2014 (Switz.) (showing that under Swiss law, “renonciation indirecte” by reference to 
institutional rules does not satisfy requirement of explicit waiver of annulment).  
 110. See, e.g., Catherine Kessedjian, Determination and Application of Relevant National and 
International Law and Rules, in PERVASIVE PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 71, 83 
(Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D.M. Lew eds., 2006) (“it would be easier to avoid looking at the 
applicable law . . . if it can be done via only the interpretation of the contract”); cf. Horacio A. 
Grigera Naón, Choice-of-Law Problems in International Commercial Arbitration, 289 REC. DES 
COURS 9, 23–38 (2001) (ICC arbitrators will frequently determine “the meaning of the arbitration 
clause” by “directly resorting to general or autonomous principles of interpretation and general 
practices concerning ICC arbitration without identifying any applicable national laws or going 
through any choice-of-law reasoning to identify the law or rules of law governing the interpretation 
of the arbitral clause,” an autonomous interpretation “premised upon interpretation criteria directly 
identified and found in general principles of contract or commercial law”); Bernard Hanotiau, 
Consent to Arbitration: Do We Share a Common Vision?, 27 ARB. INT’L 539, 552 (2011) 
(“nowadays” many arbitrators “tend to consider that the determination of the scope of the arbitration 
clause does not have to be determined in the first place on the basis of a national law” but should 
instead simply be “founded upon an analysis of facts”). 
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may not, that is, be automatically imputed to the parties themselves, who 
may have chosen the rules without full awareness of their subtleties.111  But 
the purpose of the rules must at the very least be our starting point.112  By 
agreeing to arbitrate under a given body of rules, the parties have consented 
to make them part of their deal; the question then becomes how they could 
and should have understood the text, given the framework of their common 
understanding—that is, their linguistic sophistication, their constructive 
knowledge of the “surrounding” circumstances, the “legislative history,” the 
context, the jurisprudential back story—and then finally, of course, the 
preferences we are justified in ascribing to them in light of their presumed 
overriding desire for an efficient proceeding. 
It seems unlikely, then, that either the UNCITRAL Rules involved in 
BG Group or those of the ICC ought to be fairly read as a contractual 
delegation of decision-making authority to arbitrators—and most unlikely 
that they would be so perceived outside of the U.S.113  State law ought not to 
attribute to contracting parties any intention that has been confected out of a 
mere reference to a body of rules once it is clear that these rules were 
designed and assumed to serve a completely different purpose. 
Imagine that a naïve or inexperienced U.S. judge looks at the ICC rules, 
reads that in certain circumstances “the Court” may name an arbitrator, and 
takes the “plain meaning” to be a preference of the parties for the tribunal to 
be named by the federal court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  This 
may be local linguistic usage—the settled jurisprudence of the law of the 
seat may indeed impose it—but really it is just not what the drafters of the 
 
 111. See PAULSSON, supra note 69, at 74; George A. Bermann, Arbitrability Trouble, 23 AM. 
REV. INT’L ARB. 367, 377 (2012) (distinguishing between “clear and unmistakable evidence of the 
institution’s intention” and a “demonstrat[ion] that the parties clearly and unmistakably share that 
intention”). 
 112. Cf. Tribunal fédérale 4A_124/2014 ¶ 3.4.1 (“General Conditions” of the FDIC, incorporated 
into contract, “are admittedly akin to rules of law, which may sometimes justify objective 
interpretation and taking into consideration the opinion of their author as to the meaning of the 
words they contain,” although of course “the court in charge of applying them will have the last 
word and provide individualized interpretation appropriate to the circumstances of the case at hand 
to the extent possible.”). 
 113. The AAA amicus brief claimed that the decision of the Court of Appeals “[p]uts the U.S. at 
[o]dds with the international arbitration community.”  Brief of the American Arbitration Association, 
supra note 25, at *18.  Often, appeals to “international consensus” border on chutzpah.  Quaere: 
How likely is it that an agreement to arbitrate in France under the Rules of UNCITRAL or the ICC 
would be given the same effect in French courts as in the U.S., foreclosing any review of 
“jurisdictional” awards? 
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rules intended this to mean.114 
I feel compelled to note one final, curious twist.  The current draft of the 
ALI’s project on the “Restatement of International Commercial 
Arbitration”—in opposition to an overwhelming U.S. jurisprudence—flatly 
“rejects” some of the cases mentioned above115 and refuses to accept that 
even the Rules of the AAA should be read to require deference to 
“jurisdictional” determinations by arbitral tribunals.116  This gives short 
shrift indeed to the drafting history of the AAA Rules, which were surely 
revised in order to accomplish something.  There was, I would assume, no 
pressing need at the time to act merely to ensure that arbitrators not be 
obliged to close up shop as soon as a jurisdictional objection is made.  (What 
arbitrator has ever felt so compelled?) 
My guess is that the Restatement position must be understood as an 
attempt to bridge—by fiat if necessary—the wide gap between the quite 
different preconceptions of U.S. and foreign practice.  But, of course, it is in 
the nature of a bridge that traffic may proceed in either direction: the natural 
tendency of U.S. courts to strive for symmetry between similar bodies of 
institutional rules, coupled with considerable linguistic naïveté, suggests that 
in this respect the Restatement may be on the losing side of history. 
Here is where U.S. law, in its relentless privileging of party autonomy, 
seems to have painted itself into a corner.  The conclusion we are left with is 
that whatever the defects in Justice Breyer’s craftsmanship, U.S. courts—
 
 114. See, e.g., Ansys, Inc. v. LMS Int’l, No. 06-1569, 2007 WL 1231830, at *3, (W.D. Pa. Mar. 
28, 2007), sheepishly amended by No. 06-1569, 2007 WL 1202998 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2007). 
 115. See supra notes 91–94, 98–100 and accompanying text.  
 116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 
43, § 4-14 (“de novo review of tribunal’s scope rulings”). 
  Argentina’s brief in BG Group predictably relied on the Restatement position.  See Brief for 
Respondent, supra note 37, at *18, *42.  By contrast, the amicus brief submitted on behalf of 
concerned “professors and practitioners”—urging reversal on the ground that the UNCITRAL Rules 
demonstrated the parties’ “intent to submit threshold questions to arbitrators” for a final decision—
made no mention of the Restatement at all—and, although poignant, the principal author of the brief 
was the Reporter for the Restatement project.  See Brief of Professors and Practitioners, supra note 
24, at *17. 
  I hope it is understood that nothing I have said anywhere in this piece detracts from my great 
admiration of the current state of the Restatement product.  Treading carefully among all the various 
interests, attempting to establish some sort of balance between American positive law and what is 
considered “international best practice,” is an impossible task, and it is one that the drafters have 
undertaken with immense learning and cheerfulness and good sense.  I know that the curate, in the 
celebrated Punch cartoon gamely tasting his egg at the bishop’s tea, was too eager to assure his host 
that “parts of it are excellent.”  But here, that is really the case. 
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whether by submitting to his default presumption governing arbitral 
competence or by misreading institutional rules—are likely in any event to 
wind up in the same place—the inevitable result, an exaggerated deference 
to arbitral decision making. 
II. THE ART OF TREATY INTERPRETATION IN BG GROUP 
Andrea K. Bjorklund
**
 
BG Group v. Republic of Argentina marked the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
first encounter with international investment arbitration.117  The question 
before the Court was one of treaty interpretation that would dictate the 
standard of review to be employed by the Court reviewing the award of the 
investment tribunal, and the majority of the Court initially likened the 
investment treaty between the United Kingdom and Argentina to “an 
ordinary contract between private parties.”118  The majority then asked 
“whether the fact that the document in question was a treaty made a critical 
difference, and concluded that it did not.”119  Thus, it held that the 
requirement in the treaty that an investor seek remedies locally in the host 
State for eighteen months prior to commencing investment arbitration was a 
matter of admissibility that was entrusted to the arbitrators whose decision 
must be given deference.120  The dissent, on the other hand, emphasized the 
inter-state nature of the treaty and concluded that the eighteen-month local 
remedies requirement was a condition of Argentina’s consent to arbitrate 
under the treaty; as such, it was a jurisdictional question subject to de novo 
review.121 
 
 ** Full Professor; L. Yves Fortier Chair in International Arbitration and International 
Commercial Law, McGill University Faculty of Law.  My gratitude to Alan Rau for multiple 
challenging conversations about BG Group and arbitration generally; I’ve profited enormously from 
his wisdom and clear-sightedness.  I am grateful to participants in the Pepperdine School of Law’s 
International Arbitration and the Courts Symposium for stimulating discussion and helpful 
comments.  I thank Vincent Iacono for research assistance and the students at the Pepperdine Law 
Review for their help in finalizing this article. 
 117. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1198 (2014). 
 118. Id. at 1206. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1201–02. 
 121. Id. at 1215 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  In the United States, it is possible for the parties to an 
arbitration agreement to submit questions of “arbitrability”—including jurisdictional questions—to 
the arbitrators for decision, in which case the arbitrators’ decisions are given substantial deference.  
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Nowhere in BG Group is there any reference to the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).122  U.S. courts, it is fair to say, have little to 
no interest in the VCLT,123 whereas it is the starting point for virtually any 
international tribunal that engages in treaty interpretation.124  This is curious 
given that the U.S. government accepts the VCLT as customary international 
law even though the United States has not ratified it.125  In fact, in BG 
Group, the U.S. Solicitor General urged the Court to interpret the 
Argentina–United Kingdom treaty in light of Vienna Convention 
principles.126 
International lawyers invoke the Vienna Convention as a mantra.127  
Most could cite Article 31(1) in their sleep: “[A] treaty must be interpreted 
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
 
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).   
 122. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1115 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. 
 123. A Lexis search in the database of all federal and state cases resulted in 143 cases that even 
mention the Vienna Convention.  Four of those are U.S. Supreme Court cases.  One of those 
references cited the VCLT for its definition of treaty.  Weinberg v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29 & n.5 
(1982).  A dissenting opinion referred to it for the principle that parties may not invoke their 
domestic laws for failing to conform to their treaty obligations.  See Sanchez-Llamas v. Johnson, 548 
U.S. 331, 391 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Dissenting opinions in two cases referred to it for 
principles of interpretation.  Abbot v. Abbot, 560 U.S. 1, 40 & n.11 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 191 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 124. See WAIBEL, supra note 76, at 6. 
 125. See, e.g., Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Before United 
States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281, 298 (1988).  Despite the Senate’s reaction to the Vienna 
Convention, the executive branch has utilized the Convention provisions on numerous occasions.  
Robert Dalton, Assistant Legal Adviser for the Treaty Affairs of the Department of State, explained 
that “[e]ven though the Vienna Convention is not in force for the United States, the Office of the 
Legal Adviser takes into account many of its provisions in dealing with day-to-day treaty problems.”  
See generally Robert E. Dalton, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: Consequences for 
the United States, 78 PROC. ANN. MEETING (AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.) 276 (1984).  The rationale for the 
application of the Convention is based on its representation of existing customary international law.  
The Secretary of State’s letter of submittal described the Vienna Convention to be “generally 
recognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice.”  S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 65-118, 
at 1 (1971).  A similar view was expressed by the U.S. government on the international plane.  In a 
written statement to the International Court of Justice in connection with the advisory proceedings 
relating to Namibia, the United States pronounced a general evaluation of the Vienna Convention, 
calling it “a primary source of reference for determining what are the customary principles of treaty 
law.”  Written Statements of the Government of the United States of America, Legal Consequences 
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1970 I.C.J. Pleading 843, 855 (Nov. 12, 1970). 
 126. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 27, at *17 n.4. 
 127. See infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
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terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”128  Yet one has to ask whether it is really the talisman that it seems 
to be.  It can be used as boilerplate—the VCLT’s directive on treaty 
interpretation is included in virtually every World Trade Organization panel 
and appellate body decision—but paying lip service to the language does not 
mean it is actually applied.129  Even if it is applied, it is not necessarily the 
case that its directives differ markedly from contract or statutory directives 
regarding interpretation.130  Furthermore, the identity of the interpreters, 
rather than the rules of interpretation themselves, might have considerable 
and even decisive influence on the interpretation exercise.131 
When the International Law Commission was meeting to devise the 
treaty interpretation principles that would be included in the Vienna 
Convention, it submitted a report remarking: “The interpretation of 
documents is to some extent an art, not an exact science.”132  The artistic 
nature of treaty interpretation is well illustrated not only by the Supreme 
Court in BG Group, but also by the multiple international tribunals that have 
been called upon to interpret the same or similar clauses in other Argentine 
treaties, if “artistic” implies variable approaches and outcomes.133 
 
 128. VCLT, supra note 122, at art. 31(1). 
 129. See Isabelle van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body, 21 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 605, 621 (2010); see also W. Michael Reisman & Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Interpreting Treaties 
for the Benefit of Third Parties: The “Salvors’ Doctrine” and the Use of Legislative History in 
Investment Treaties, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 597, 598–99 (2010) (“[The provisions of the Vienna 
Convention] have become something of a clause de style in international judgments and arbitral 
awards; whether routinely and briefly referred to or solemnly reproduced verbatim, they are not 
always systematically applied.”); Michael Waibel, International Investment Law and Treaty 
Interpretation, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM 
CLINICAL ISOLATION TO SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION 29 (Reiner Hoffmann & Christian Tams eds., 
2011).  
 130. See generally KENNETH J. KEITH, INTERPRETING TREATIES, STATUTES AND CONTRACTS 
(2009), http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/Keith_article.pdf.  See also supra note 76 (Professor Rau noting 
that, as an erstwhile contracts professor, he thinks “everything is already present in the familiar 
corpus of private law” and expressing his skepticism that the VCLT is the key to the “murky 
mystery of proper treaty construction”). 
 131. Michael Waibel, Interpretive Communities in International Law, in INTERPRETATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 147, 147–48 (A. Bianchi, D. Peat & M. Windsor eds., 2015). 
 132. Reports of the International Law Commission, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 169, 218, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1966. 
 133. See, e.g., SAM LUTTRELL, BIAS CHALLENGES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION: THE NEED FOR A “REAL DANGER” TEST 57–58 (2009) (discussing the United 
Kingdom’s treatment of an Argentine treaty).  
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This Part will first discuss in more detail the decision in BG Group.  
Second, it will lay out the interpretive provisions of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties and explore and offer a few observations about where 
these might differ from contract interpretation, even if these are differences 
of degree rather than of kind.  It will also introduce the idea of interpretive 
communities.  Third, this Part will discuss how the confluence of 
interpretive principles and interpretive communities affected the process of 
decision making in BG Group. 
A. The BG Group Decision 
The investment treaty arbitration in BG Group was based on the 
Argentina–United Kingdom bilateral investment treaty (BIT), which 
contains a provision requiring an investor to seek local remedies for eighteen 
months prior to commencing investment arbitration under the auspices of the 
BIT.134  The investor did not, in fact, seek local remedies but went 
immediately to arbitration.  There might have been good reason for this; BG 
Group sought relief for measures that Argentina took in response to its 
financial crisis, but Argentina required an automatic stay of all cases in 
Argentine courts that challenged Argentina’s emergency measures.135  
Furthermore, Argentina precluded licensees who sought judicial redress 
from participating in the license renegotiation process.136  While technically 
it seems possible that BG Group could have formally filed a claim in 
Argentine courts, which would not have been heard, and then sought redress 
in arbitration eighteen months later, Argentina might well have challenged 
the jurisdiction of the tribunal on the grounds that the eighteen-month period 
could only begin running once the court action itself had re-commenced.137 
Argentina objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal on the grounds that 
BG Group had failed to seek local remedies and thus had failed to trigger a 
condition necessary to Argentina’s consent to arbitration under the treaty, 
but the BIT tribunal rejected its claim.   
Where recourse to the domestic judiciary is unilaterally prevented 
 
 134. U.K.-Arg. BIT, supra note 14, at art. 8(2). 
 135. See BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1204–05 (2014). 
 136. See id. at 1212. 
 137. Id. at 1205. 
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or hindered by the host State, any such interpretation [that local 
remedies prevented access to arbitration] would lead to the kind of 
absurd and unreasonable result proscribed by Article 32 of the 
Vienna Convention, allowing the State to unilaterally elude 
arbitration, which has been the engine of the transition from a 
politicized system of diplomatic protection to one of direct investor-
State adjudication.138 
The UNCITRAL tribunal awarded $185 million in damages to 
Argentina, and Argentina sought to have the award set aside in U.S. District 
Court for the District of Columbia, the place of arbitration.139  The U.S. 
District Court dismissed Argentina’s petition, but the D.C. Circuit reversed 
that decision on appeal.140  The Federal Arbitration Act provides limited 
grounds for setting aside an award; one of them is that “the arbitrators [have] 
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, 
and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”141  
Whether a tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction is a fairly common question 
in set-aside cases, as the arbitral law in most jurisdictions permits set aside 
on the basis of excess of authority.142  Yet answering the question requires 
deciding whether the arbitrators’ decision was one of jurisdiction—i.e. did 
the parties’ consent to arbitration hinge on a condition being fulfilled—or 
one of admissibility.  Questions of admissibility are presumptively for the 
arbitrator to decide, and a domestic court will not revisit the arbitrators’ 
decision in a set-aside proceeding.143  Questions of jurisdiction, however, 
involve the very basis for the arbitrators’ exercise of authority and will 
 
 138. BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, Final Award, ¶ 147 (UNCITRAL Arbitral 
Tribunal, 2007). 
 139. See Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 108, 112 (D.D.C. 2010), rev’d, 
665 F.3d 1363 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled by 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014). 
 140. See id. 
 141. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012). 
 142. See, e.g., U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, at art. 34(2)(iii), U.N. Sales No. E.08.V.4 (2006) 
(“An arbitral award may be set aside . . . only if . . . the award deals with a dispute not contemplated 
by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters 
beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration . . . .”).  See generally JULIAN LEW, LOUKAS 
MISTELIS & STEFAN KRÖLL, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 533 
(2003). 
 143. See Paulsson, supra note 9, at 617. 
[Vol. XX: N, 201x] BG Group and “Conditions” to Arbitral Jurisdiction 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
144 
ordinarily be revisited by the reviewing court de novo.144  Thus, in this case 
the question was whether the eighteen-month local remedies requirement 
was a matter of jurisdiction or of admissibility.145 
In the United States, however, there is a further, complicating question.  
The United States permits the parties to an arbitral agreement to entrust the 
jurisdictional decision—the question of arbitrability—to the arbitrators: if 
the parties have done so, then the reviewing court will give deference to the 
arbitrators’ determination about their own jurisdiction.146 
A great deal of the D.C. Circuit’s decision revolved around this second 
question.  The court asked whether the question of “arbitrability” had been 
entrusted to the arbitrators, without first ascertaining whether this particular 
question should be viewed as one of admissibility or jurisdiction (which 
would establish presumptions about what the parties intended).147  The court 
concluded that it had not been entrusted to the arbitrators and remanded to 
the district court.148 
The Supreme Court granted BG Group’s petition for certiorari and 
reversed.149  The initial question answered by the Court was whether the 
matter in question was one of admissibility, in which case it would be 
viewed as entrusted to the arbitrators for their decision, or whether it was 
jurisdictional, in which case the presumption would be that the question was 
 
 144. Id.  
 145. The answer to this question is not clear-cut.  It has arisen in several cases involving 
Argentine treaties with the eighteen-month local remedies requirement in them, and arbitral tribunals 
have themselves been split on this question.  See, e.g., Philip Morris Brands SARL v. Oriental 
Republic of Arg., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Decision on Jurisdiction (July 2, 2013); Teniver S.A., 
Transportes de Cercanias S.A. and Autobuses Urbanos del Sur S.A. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/09/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 135 (Dec. 21, 2012); ICS Inspection & Control 
Servs. Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, PCA Case No. 2010-9 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012) (decision on 
jurisdiction); TSA Spectrum de Arg. SA v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/5, 
Award, ¶ 112 (Dec. 19, 2008).  
 146. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995); see also supra pp. 104–05, 
112.  See generally Rau, supra note 1, at 93.   
 147. While the D.C. Circuit presented the “who decides” question as preceding that of whether the 
condition precedent was a jurisdictional limitation, it is difficult not to conclude that assumptions 
about the latter colored its decision as to the former and affected its determination as to the “intent of 
the parties.”  In other words, the court’s conclusion that the eighteen-month period was a 
jurisdictional matter meant that it viewed it as unlikely the parties would have assigned final 
authority over its import to the arbitral tribunal.  Bjorklund, supra note 74, at 6–8. 
 148. Republic of Argentina v. BG Grp. PLC, 665 F.3d 1363, 1373 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled by 
134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014).   
 149. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1213 (2014).  
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for the court unless the parties had agreed otherwise.150  Justice Breyer 
likened the question to those posed by U.S. arbitration cases such as 
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. and Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.151 
The Court went on to state: “Were [the treaty an ordinary contract], we 
conclude, the matter would be for the arbitrators.  We then ask whether the 
fact that the document in question is a treaty makes a critical difference.  We 
conclude that it does not.”152  Citing U.S. cases on principles of treaty 
interpretation, the Court could find nothing in the treaty that would require a 
contrary conclusion.153  The Court interpreted the treaty in light of U.S. 
arbitration law and applied the same presumptions it would apply to an 
ordinary contract to arbitrate.154  So, because the court viewed the eighteen-
month local remedies requirement as a procedural step similar to the 
requirements in Howsam, the Court viewed the question as one of 
admissibility entrusted to the arbitrators for determination.155 
The dissent, on the other hand, emphasized that a treaty is different from 
a contract.156  Indeed, it chastised the majority for its failure to appreciate the 
distinction: “It should come as no surprise that, after starting down the 
wrong road, the majority ends up at the wrong place.”157  Yet 
notwithstanding its rhetoric, the dissent’s focus seemed to be almost entirely 
on the subsidiary contract (or lack thereof)—the agreement between BG 
Group and Argentina about arbitrating the actual dispute—with a great deal 
of emphasis on Argentina’s sovereign nature and the likelihood that 
Argentina would not have agreed to arbitrate unless the investor had sought 
relief in local courts for eighteen months.158  The dissent emphasized 
repeatedly the intent of the parties and held that Argentina’s intent was that 
there would be no agreement to arbitrate absent resort to local courts for 
 
 150. Id. at 1203–04. 
 151. Id. at 1202, 1207–08; see also Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002); 
Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 152. BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1209. 
 153. Id. at 1208–09 (citing Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 
433, 439 (1921); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 56 (1903)). 
 154. Id. at 1209.  
 155. Id. at 1207–08. 
 156. Id. at 1215 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 157. Id.   
 158. Id. at 1216–20. 
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eighteen months.159  In the course of its discussion, the dissent ignored the 
fact that the treaty was concluded between two sovereign states for the 
benefit of their investors and for the promotion of their investments and 
focused almost exclusively on Argentina’s intent, not on the shared intent of 
Argentina and the United Kingdom. 
Once the dissent concluded that the question of the eighteen-month local 
remedies requirement was in fact an issue of jurisdiction, it then concluded 
that a court’s review of the decision ought to be de novo because the 
question the tribunal was answering went to whether there was any kind of 
agreement to arbitrate whatsoever,160 as opposed to the Howsam questions of 
whether the parties are “bound by a given arbitration clause” or “whether an 
arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular 
type of controversy.”161  Here again, the dissent focused on the lack of a 
completed agreement to arbitrate between BG Group and Argentina based 
on BG Group’s failure to satisfy the condition of consent.162 
The dissent did not stop there.  It referred to the possibility (with a 
glancing reference to the local remedies rule)163 that should resort to local 
remedies be futile, it might be possible to conclude that there was an 
agreement to arbitrate.  Here the dissent reverted to a discussion of 
municipal law contract principles to conclude “that an offeree’s failure to 
comply with an essential condition of the unilateral offer ‘will not bar an 
action, if failure to comply with the condition is due to the offeror’s own 
fault.’”164  Thus, the dissent would have remanded the case for findings on 
that question. 
Justice Sotomayor, in concurrence, took an intermediate position.  She 
concluded that nothing in this particular treaty indicated that the eighteen-
month period was a condition of consent, yet noted that the language and 
structure of other treaties might lead to a different conclusion should those 
treaties be subject to interpretation.165 
 
 159. Id. at 1219. 
 160. Id. at 1216, 1221. 
 161. Id. at 1206 (majority opinion). 
 162. Id. at 1222 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 163. Id. at 1224. 
 164. Id. (citing 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 5:14 (4th ed. 2015)). 
 165. Id. at 1213–15 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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B. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Interpretive 
Communities 
For international lawyers, a discussion of treaty interpretation 
commences with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  The 
Vienna Convention was concluded under the auspices of the International 
Law Commission in 1969.166  It entered into force in 1980.167  Its rules on 
interpretation are widely accepted as statements of customary international 
law.168  Those rules do not exist in a vacuum; a decision maker or decision 
makers apply them.  Those decision makers may affect the interpretive 
endeavor either by the rules of interpretation they apply, or by their 
background training, assumptions, experiences, and the like—what one 
might call their membership in an interpretive community or communities—
or both. 
1. The Interpretive Principles of the Vienna Convention 
The basic interpretation provisions are found in Articles 31 and 32.
169
  
Article 31 provides that treaties must “be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”170  This directive 
has three principles–four if you add the admonition to interpret the 
provisions “in good faith,” which is not unimportant.171 
First, the direction is that the interpretation be objective and focus on the 
“ordinary meaning” of the terms.
172
  Second, the direction is that the 
interpretation occur in context.173  Context is defined to encompass not only 
the remainder of the treaty, but also the preamble and annexes, as well as 
“[a]ny agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all of the 
parties in connexion” with the treaty’s conclusion, or “[a]ny instrument 
 
 166. IAN MCTAGGART SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 1 (2d ed. 
1984). 
 167. Id. at ix. 
 168. See, e.g., Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 
Judgment, 1991 ICJ Rep. 53, 70 (Nov. 12).   
 169. VCLT, supra note 122, at arts. 31–32. 
 170. Id. at art. 31(1). 
 171. SINCLAIR, supra note 166, at 119–20. 
 172. VCLT, supra note 122, at art. 31(1).  
 173. Id. at art. 31(2). 
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which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of 
the treaty and accepted by the other parties.”174  Third, the direction is that 
the interpretation be teleological—that it occur in light of the “object and 
purpose” of the treaty.175  That intent is to be inferred from the text of the 
treaty, not from unilateral statements made by parties to the treaty.176  As if 
this were not enough, this process is supposed to occur in a “crucible”—all 
three are to be considered simultaneously, and none of them are to be given 
precedence over the others.177 
The rest of Article 31 acknowledges the law-making role of the State 
parties to the treaty in terms of their ability to engage in subsequent 
agreements about the treaty, subsequent practice about the treaty, and that 
the treaty should be interpreted in light of international law more 
generally.178 
Could you find principles similar to those found in the VCLT in contract 
interpretation?  Absolutely.  The objective meaning of a contract has become 
paramount.179  A contractual provision should be interpreted in order to give 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at art. 31(1). 
 176. Indeed, this result was part of the battle between professors during the Vienna Convention’s 
negotiation.  Herbert W. Briggs, The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order—
Principles of Content and Procedure, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 543 (1968) (reviewing MYRES S. 
MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & JAMES C. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS 
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER PRINCIPLES OF CONTENT AND PROCEDURE (1967)). 
 177. See Reports of the Commission to the General Assembly, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 
169, 219–20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1966/Add. 1 (“Having regard to certain observations in the 
comments of Governments the Commission considered it desirable to underline its concept of the 
relation between the various elements of interpretation in [article 31] and the relation between these 
elements . . . .  Those observations appeared to indicate a possible fear that the successive paragraphs 
of [article 31] might be taken as laying down a hierarchical order for the application of the various 
elements of interpretation in the article.  The Commission, by heading the article ‘General rule of 
interpretation’ in the singular and by underlining the connexion between paragraphs 1 and 2 and 
again between paragraph 3 and the two previous paragraphs, intended to indicate that the application 
of the means of interpretation in the article would be a single combined operation.  All the various 
elements, as they were present in any given case, would be thrown into the crucible, and their 
interaction would give the legally relevant interpretation.  Thus, article 27 is entitled ‘General rule of 
interpretation’ in the singular, not ‘General rules’ in the plural, because the Commission desired to 
emphasize that the process of interpretation is a unity and that the provisions of the article form a 
single, closely integrated rule.”).   
 178. See generally Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty Interpretation: 
The Dual Role of States, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179 (2010).   
 179. CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 41 (7th ed. 2012) (rejecting the subjective approach); see also 
[Vol. XX: N, 201x] BG Group and “Conditions” to Arbitral Jurisdiction 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
149 
other provisions in the agreement meaning.180  It should be interpreted in 
light of the circumstances in which it was made.181  The contract might be 
interpreted in light of trade usage and the expectations of those versed in the 
field, thus broadening the context.182  Relational contract theory even 
suggests that good faith can be considered.183  Certainly there are underlying 
assumptions about the commercial goals likely driving each of the parties 
and that their intent that the contract be binding.184 
One of the key features of the VCLT is that no one of the three 
principles has priority—they are supposed to be applied holistically.  In 
contract interpretation, there is no overarching directive that each of those 
principles be applied in each case. 
2. Interpretive Communities 
The U.S. Supreme Court justices’ indifference to the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties and its overall approach to international law might be 
 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 40, § 21 (rejecting the subjective approach).  
One still can find a distressing number of references to the “meeting of the minds” in determining 
whether or not a contract has actually been formed.  KNAPP ET AL., supra, at 33.  
 180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 40, § 202(2); see also id. § 203(a) (“In 
the interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof . . . an interpretation which gives a 
reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which 
leaves a part unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect.”). 
 181. Id. § 202(1) (“Words and other conduct are interpreted in the light of all the circumstances, 
and if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable it is given great weight.”). 
 182. Id. § 222(3) (“Unless otherwise agreed, a usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which the 
parties are engaged or a usage of trade of which they known or have reason to know gives meaning 
to or supplements or qualifies their agreement.”). 
 183. See Ian R. MacNeil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neo-Classical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 890 n.112 (1978).  
For a discussion of relational contract theory and treaty interpretation, see Jared Wessel, Relational 
Contract Theory and Treaty Interpretation: End-Game Treaties v. Dynamic Obligations, 60 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 149 (2004); Curtis Mahoney, Note, Treaties as Contracts: Textualism, Contract 
Theory, and the Interpretation of Treaties, 116 YALE L.J. 824 (2007).  
 184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 40, § 203 (“The validity of a contract 
will be sustained against the charge of usury if it provides for a rate of interest that is permissible in a 
state to which the contract has a substantial relationship and is not greatly in excess of the rate 
permitted by the general usury law of the state of the otherwise applicable law under the rule of § 
188.”); see Brainerd Currie, Ehrenzqeig and the Statute of Frauds: An Inquiry into the “Rule of 
Validation,” 18 OK. L. REV. 243, 252–63 (1965) (discussion on “rule of validation”); cf. Anthea 
Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 45, 48 (2013). 
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attributed to the “epistemic community”—one of the most famous in the 
world—formed by those justices.185  An epistemic community is “a network 
of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular 
domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that 
domain or issue area.”186  An individual’s membership in an epistemic 
community might affect the interpretive process he or she undertakes.187  An 
“interpretive community” is more specific than an epistemic community and 
refers to those engaged in the process of interpretation.188  The concept of 
the interpretive community is usually traced to Stanley Fish and focuses “not 
so much [on] a group of individuals who share . . . a point of view, but a 
point of view or way of organizing experience that share[s] individuals.”189 
The idea that the process of interpretation is affected by those who are 
doing the interpreting, and that those doing the interpreting influence each 
other, has not escaped international law scholars.190  As Michael Waibel 
says: “The meaning of international law norms hinges on background 
principles shared by interpreters who form part of one or several interpretive 
communities.”191  Thus, those “who routinely appl[y] the VCLT could be 
 
 185. See generally Waibel, supra note 131, at 149 (defining epistemic community).  Scholars 
argue over the identity of particular communities, and whether certain groups (such as federal 
judges) truly form part of an interpretive community.  Id. at 152. 
 186. Id. at 149 (quoting Peter Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International 
Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 3 (1992)). 
 187. See Andrea Bianchi, Epistemic Communities, in FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS FOR 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jean d’Aspremont & Sahib Singh eds., forthcoming 2016) (“On an approach 
to interpretation where meaning is presented as primarily a social construct, which is produced by a 
complex web of social relations, including the context, the conventional use of words in any given 
society as well as the cognitive frames that influence perception and determine outcomes, the role of 
interpretive communities and the strategies deployed by them to attribute meaning is crucial.”); Ian 
Johnstone, Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretive Communities, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
371, 371–72 (1991).  
 188. Waibel, supra note 131, at 151 (“[E]pistemic community is a more generic term [than 
interpretive community].”).  
 189.  Id. at 150 (quoting STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, 
AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 141 (1989)).  Jutta Brunné and 
Stephen Toope have discussed “communities of practice” that explain the formation of shared 
understandings among international lawyers.  See generally JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, 
LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT (2010).   
 190. Michael Waibel, Demystifying the Art of Interpretation, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 571, 586 (2011).  
See generally Waibel, supra note 131, at 147 (“Any account of interpretation is incomplete without 
the sociological dimension of interpretive communities.”).  
 191. Waibel, supra note 131, at 147; see also Oscar Schachter, Metaphors and Realism in 
International Law, 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 268, 269 (2002) (“The construct of interpretive 
[Vol. XX: N, 201x] BG Group and “Conditions” to Arbitral Jurisdiction 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
151 
regarded as forming part of the interpretive community of international 
lawyers.”192  Yet “[n]o single interpretive community exists in international 
law, if it ever did.”193 
A member of an interpretive community might be a member of more 
than one epistemic community and, indeed, more than one interpretive 
community.194  In fact, one of the challenges in delineating an interpretive 
community is that almost everyone belongs to more than one.  Above, I have 
described the U.S. Supreme Court as an interpretive community, but each of 
its members is part of other interpretive communities as well.  The same 
would hold true for international arbitrators and international judges. 
C. National Courts and International Law 
It is easy to look at the two primary BG Group decisions and be critical 
of both the majority and the dissent.  Interpretation in any context is 
difficult, and approaches to interpretation in different categories of 
instruments, such as treaties, contracts, and statutes, overlap in significant 
aspects, even if that overlap is incomplete.195  Lord McNair said: “There is 
no part of the law of treaties which the text-writer approaches with more 
trepidation than the question of interpretation.”196  Interpretive principles do 
not always show the way as clearly as one might hope.  Karl Llewellyn 
compiled “opposing canons” of statutory interpretation, which he described 
as a “technical framework for maneuver.”197 
 
community has been invoked as an alternative to the ‘invisible college of international law’ . . . .  
Interpretive communities have also been identified as a significant element in specialized areas.  
Historically, the leading maritime powers have left their imprint on the law of the sea.  Even more 
visible today is the ‘community’ of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, who 
collectively are continuously engaged in construing the UN Charter on issues of security.”). 
 192. Waibel, supra note 131, at 150; cf. Bianchi, supra note 187 (noting the influence of the 
epistemic community of international lawyers in fixing the terms of the discourse about international 
law and citing the broad agreement that Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
as establishing the sources of international law, whereas in fact Article 38 is simply a direction to the 
International Court of Justice as to the sources it might apply when deciding a case). 
 193. Waibel, supra note 131, at 151.  
 194. Id.  
 195. See KEITH, supra note 130, at 2. 
 196. ARNOLD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 364 (1961). 
 197. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons 
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950).  
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Thus, whether one is interpreting a treaty, a contract, or a statute,198 
interpretation is more of an art than a science.199  Analogizing treaties to 
contracts is natural; “the legal identity of treaties and contracts is almost 
universally assumed by writers upon International Law . . . .  [I]n matter of 
form, it is undeniably true; the nearest approach in private law to the treaty 
in point of form is the contract,”200 yet inappropriate in some cases because 
not all treaties are similar to contracts.  In 1930, Lord McNair wrote an 
influential article identifying two sorts of treaties: (1) those that are 
contractual in nature in that they resolve a single issue in dispute between 
the parties and (2) those that are legislative in nature in that they set out the 
contours of a regime whose interstices will be filled out later.201  More 
recently Lea Brilmayer has equated human rights treaties to pledges–binding 
unilateral commitments.202  Others have referred to a “treaty regime”—the 
development, in part by arbitral tribunals, of a unique ecosystem of 
investment law.203 
By approaching the treaty in the first instance as if it were a contract, the 
majority essentially makes it so.  It interpreted the treaty in light of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s approach to commercial arbitral agreements.204  Once it 
had equated the eighteen-month local remedies clause to the procedural 
hurdles found in some domestic U.S. arbitration agreements, it then 
 
 198. I do not mean to suggest that these are the only three areas in which interpretation is at issue, 
but they are the three where textual meaning is sometimes elusive and often an object of dispute.  
For a short exposition of interpretation in international law generally, see Duncan B. Hollis, 
Interpretation and International Law, in FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF A DISCIPLINE (Jean d’Aspremont & Sahib Singh eds., 2015). 
 199. “[T]he rules and principles [of interpretation] are elusive in the extreme.  Certainly the 
interpretation of treaties is an art rather than a science, though it is part of the art that it should have 
the appearance of a science.”  Robert Y. Jennings, General Course on Principles of International 
Law, 121 RECUEIL DES COURS 323, 544 (1967). 
 200. Arnold D. McNair, The Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties, 11 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 100, 106 (1930).  
 201. Id. at 105–16. 
 202. Lea Brilmayer, From ‘Contract’ to ‘Pledge’: The Structure of International Human Rights 
Agreements, 77 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 163, 166 (2006). 
 203. Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 427, 
431 (2010).  No less an authority than Gary Born has suggested the desirability of developing 
specialized rules of interpretation for investment treaties, though he is not sanguine about the 
possibility of that happening any time soon.  Gary Born, Should Investment Treaties Have Their 
Own Rules of Interpretation?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Feb. 3, 2015), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/ 
blog/2015/02/03/should-inverstment-treaties-have-their-own-rules-of-interpretation/. 
 204. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1207–08 (2014). 
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established a presumption that the clause deserved the same treatment.205  
That presumption could, perhaps, be overcome if the treaty language 
specifically gainsaid it, but in this particular instance the treaty’s language 
was equivocal or even non-existent, which is not surprising given that the 
treaty drafters had no reason to think they should insert language to affect 
the interpretation in light of U.S. arbitral law one way or the other. 
From a treaty interpretation viewpoint this approach seems backwards, 
to say the least.  The starting point in the interpretation of what the treaty 
means would be the language of the treaty itself. 
The dissent understood this, and indeed, the dissent started with the 
language of the treaty.206  Yet the dissent’s approach to treaty interpretation 
departed from the VCLT approach in significant ways.  The most prominent 
feature of this departure was the emphasis on the enormity of a State’s 
consent to waive sovereign immunity in order that disputes with it can be 
submitted to arbitration.207  This rhetoric recalls very much the doctrine of 
restrictive interpretation, under which states argued that treaty provisions 
imposing limitations to their sovereignty should be read restrictively.208  But 
the doctrine of restrictive interpretation has been discredited.209  According 
to the VCLT, treaties are to be interpreted according their terms.  One might, 
of course, view the dissent as referring to the “object and purpose” of the 
treaty by regarding it as unlikely that the State parties to the treaty would 
have wanted to subject themselves to international arbitration without 
investors’ first “having a go” in local courts.  Yet this interpretation fails to 
consider the protective purpose of the treaty—the goal of affording 
protections to foreign investors, which they can vindicate in international 
arbitration.210  In addition, it ignores the fact that another State party was 
 
 205. Id. at 1207.  
 206. Id. at 1215 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 207. Id. at 1216. 
 208. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION) 179 (1927).  Judge Lauterpacht, 
writing in 1927, noted that at most the doctrine of restrictive interpretation could be a subsidiary 
method of interpretation, to be employed if other methods failed.  Id. at 180. 
 209. See RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 405–07 (2d ed. 2015). 
 210. For a more sympathetic view of the dissent, see Anthea Roberts & Christina Trahanas, 
Judicial Review of Investment Treaty Awards: BG Group v. Argentina, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 750 
(2014).  Professor Rau has suggested that a focus on the protective purpose of the treaty “seems 
tendentious and calculated to lead ineluctably to a decision in favor of the claimant.”  See supra note 
77.  Perhaps this is true, and I do not posit that this is the treaty’s only goal, but it was certainly one 
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involved in the negotiation of the treaty itself but was not party to the 
arbitral agreement.  As Sir Franklin Berman said: 
Every case of the interpretation of a BIT by an ICSID 
Tribunal shares this unusual feature, namely that the 
Tribunal has to find the meaning of a bilateral instrument, 
one of the Parties to which (the Respondent) will be a party 
before the Tribunal, while the other Treaty Party by 
definition will not.  Or, to put the matter the other way 
round, one of the parties to the arbitration before the 
Tribunal (but not the other) will have been a stranger to the 
treaty negotiation . . . .  That circumstance surely imposes a 
particular duty of caution on the Tribunal: it can clearly not 
discount assertions put forward in argument by the 
Respondent as to the intentions behind the BIT and its 
negotiation (since that is authentic information which may 
be of importance), but it must at the same time treat them 
with all due caution, in the interests of its overriding duty to 
treat the parties to the arbitration on a basis of complete 
equality (since it is also possible that assertions by the 
Respondent may be incomplete, misleading or even self-
serving).  In other words, it must be very rarely indeed that 
an ICSID Tribunal, confronted with a disputed issue of 
interpretation of a BIT, will accept at face value the 
assertions of the Respondent as to its meaning without 
some sufficient objective evidence to back them up.211 
Note further that there is no discussion of “intent” as such in the VCLT.  
In BG Group, both the majority and the dissent raised the question of intent 
on numerous occasions.  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
deliberately attempted to emphasize the objective nature of the agreement—
intent is relevant only as reflected in the treaty (or in some of the 
 
of them.  Ignoring the fact that the United Kingdom, as a capital-exporting country, was likely 
seeking to protect its investors in Argentina while focusing on Argentina’s assertion that requiring 
recourse to local remedies for a period of time was a condition of its consent seems equally likely to 
lead to an outcome inevitably favorable to the respondent.   
 211. Industra Nacional de Alimentos, S.A. v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4, 
Decision on Annulment, ¶ 9 (Sept. 5, 2007) (Franklin Berman, dissenting).  Sir Franklin Berman 
was formerly the Legal Adviser in the United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office.   
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accompanying context), but not in the “minds” of the State parties to the 
treaty.212  This was important because of the propensity of States to argue 
later that treaties did not mean what they seemed to mean because the states 
had not “intended” that meaning.213  So intent is supposed to flow from the 
treaty, including from its object and purpose, but not from what States argue 
later about what their intent was (unless the two States actually agree in the 
form of a subsequent agreement).214 
Another consequence of the majority’s approach is that it tends to 
equate—or even conflate—the two agreements at issue.  The first is the 
treaty and its provisions.  The second is the specific agreement to arbitrate—
the contract—whose content is informed by the terms of the treaty.215  
The treaty itself contains no decision about the delegation of authority to 
an arbitral tribunal to decide matters of arbitrability.  Indeed, it would be 
absurd to construe a treaty between two sovereign governments, neither of 
which is the United States, in light of a concept peculiar to U.S. arbitration 
law, particularly when there is nothing in the treaty that indicates any 
preference for the place of arbitration to be a U.S. venue and when one of 
the options is ICSID Arbitration.216  Treaty interpretation vis-à-vis its 
approach to arbitrability should not vary depending on the venue chosen for 
the arbitration.  The dissent in BG Group suggests that the treaty’s structure 
separates the question of the eighteen-month remedies period from other 
arbitrability questions and implies that that difference might lead to a 
different answer as to the latter questions.217  Yet there is no reason to 
assume that the treaty’s drafters contemplated this question at all.218 
The place where U.S. arbitration law regarding arbitrability might play a 
 
 212. See VCLT, supra note 122, at art. 18. 
 213. “[T]he text must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties; 
and that [is], in consequence, the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of 
the text, not an investigation ab initio into the intentions of the parties.”  Reports of the Commission 
to the General Assembly, supra note 177, at 220. 
 214. See VCLT, supra note 122, art. 31(3)(a), (4).  
 215. See supra pp. 118–20 (discussing the potential usefulness of the “third-party beneficiary” 
analogy in assessing the existence of a contract between the State and the investor). 
 216. See George A. Bermann, The “Gateway” Problem in International Commercial Arbitration, 
37 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2012).  ICSID Convention arbitration is “a-national” and the lex arbitri is 
the Convention itself and the associated arbitration rules; there is no “place” of arbitration. 
 217. BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1217–18 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting).  
 218. In fact, the treaty was concluded in 1991, four years before the First Options decision.  
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role would be in the subsidiary contract to arbitrate formed between 
Argentina and the U.K. investor.  Did those entities, by selecting 
Washington, D.C. as the place of arbitration, effectively make a 
determination that they were referring “jurisdictional” decisions to the 
arbitrators?  Simply choosing a U.S. venue as the place of arbitration is 
insufficient to confer that authority on the arbitrators.219  Yet nothing in the 
treaty would seem to preclude the disputing parties from making that 
determination should they have wished to do so in their subsidiary 
agreement.  Yet there is no evidence that they did so here.220 
Moreover, Professor Rau reminds us that the core question is the 
parties’ “presumed intention to act efficiently in the interest of maximizing 
mutual gains.”221  Through that lens, the eighteen-month local remedies 
period appears most likely to have been a compromise between an 
exhaustion of local remedies requirement and the possibility of immediate 
recourse to arbitration.  If one accepts that the treaty parties did not confer 
final authority as to arbitrability on the arbitrators, and that the parties to the 
arbitration did not do so either, one is still left with the question of whether 
decisions regarding the condition precedent are jurisdictional (and therefore 
subject to de novo review) or are matters of admissibility (and therefore 
within the purview of the arbitrators).   
Distinguishing between jurisdiction and admissibility is difficult.  
Objections going to the existence and validity of the agreement to arbitrate 
are generally jurisdictional; many of those that might be described as 
conditions precedent to arbitration are ordinarily treated as matters of 
 
 219. A court “should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is 
‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so.”  First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 
U.S. 938, 944 (1995).  Had the parties agreed to arbitrate under the ICDR Rules of the AAA, the 
answer might be different.  Those rules were explicitly amended to take advantage of the invitation 
extended in First Options to confer the authority to answer questions about arbitrability on the 
arbitrators.  This “bootstrapping” raises discomfort among some commentators and has been rejected 
by the Restatement (Third) of the U.S. Law on International Commercial Arbitration as 
insufficiently evidencing a clear intent to confer the final say about arbitrability on the arbitrators.  
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW ON INT’L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 43, 
§ 4-14 & reporters’ note e.  For criticism, see supra pp. 166–67. 
 220. See supra pp. 157–65 (noting unlikeliness of parties’ agreement to arbitrate under the 
UNCTRAL arbitration rules as encompassing a conferral of authority on the tribunal as to matters 
related to arbitrability and especially that the UNCITRAL rules did not contain any specific waiver 
provision).   
 221. See supra p. 107. 
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admissibility.222  Yet almost any objection can be characterized as going to 
the consent of the parties to arbitrate, which is precisely what Argentina did 
here.  For example, the argument “I consented only to arbitrate claims that 
had been the object of a bona fide, structured attempt at settlement” might 
well be an argument going to jurisdiction if the validity of the agreement is 
deemed to depend on that condition having been met.223  This is what Jan 
Paulsson terms the “twilight zone,” the difficult cases in which one is 
“hostage to whatever presumptions individual decision-makers may wish to 
make about unexpressed intentions.”224 
Professor Rau has suggested that whether the challenge negates consent 
to the forum itself, or whether it would merely extinguish the claim 
regardless of the forum in which it is sought,225 is less helpful in the treaty 
context.  First, as noted above, the challenge negates an agreement to 
arbitrate for the time being; it does not entirely negate the existence of an 
agreement to arbitrate.226  Second, challenges to jurisdiction assume there is 
an alternate forum in which the case would otherwise be brought.  
Investment arbitration is different in that the claim in front of the arbitral 
tribunal will be based on the investment treaty, while the claim in Argentine 
courts would almost certainly be based on municipal law.  In addition, even 
if a court were to decide the case within the eighteen-month period, that 
decision itself can be challenged in treaty arbitration.227  Taken together, 
these provisions suggest that the objection goes to the claim and the time at 
which the claim can be brought, rather than to the forum itself, and thus 
should be considered a matter of admissibility.228   
 Turning back to the BG Group decision, it is noteworthy that after 
emphasizing Argentina’s status as a sovereign and the condition on consent 
as a treaty-based obligation that precluded the formation of a subsidiary 
 
 222. Paulsson, supra note 9, at 616. 
 223. Id. at 613–14. 
 224. Id. at 614. 
 225. Rau, supra note 1, at 70. 
 226. This is especially true if one accepts the third-party beneficiary theory, whereby an 
agreement is concluded between the United Kingdom and Argentina for the benefit of subsequent 
investors.  See supra pp. 118–20. 
 227. U.K.-Arg. BIT, supra note 14, at art. 8.2(a)(ii). 
 228. This determination does not render the provision empty.  Cf. supra p. 143 (“[I]t does not 
seem fair to treat the BIT’s local-litigation requirement entirely as an empty, formal ritual without 
operative significance.”).  Arbitrators could presumably find that the conditions for admissibility had 
not been satisfied and dismiss the case on those grounds.   
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contract between Argentina and BG Group, the dissent then focused on that 
hypothetical subsidiary contract as if it were an ordinary contract between 
two private parties and embraced the safe haven of municipal contract law 
principles.229  Thus, arguably the dissent fell into the same trap as the 
majority in that it assessed the agreement spawned by the treaty in light of 
questions that it seemed earlier to view as appropriate only in the context of 
a commercial dispute.  Or, to put it another way, if fulfillment of the 
condition on consent in the treaty was so important to Argentina that the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction was precluded by its failure to come to fruition, could 
a municipal contract law principle be used to overcome Argentina’s 
objections?  Would it not have been more consistent with the dissent’s 
viewpoint to have looked to international law to determine whether 
Argentina could be allowed to capitalize on its arguable interference with the 
ability of BG Group to satisfy the condition?  Estoppel is a principle of 
general international law that might be employed to the same effect.230  
Moreover, the argument that “after their entry into domestic legal systems, 
international rights or obligations are still to be applied as international law 
rather than domestic law, has a long pedigree in international legal 
scholarship.”231 
U.S. courts are not the only courts that have problems when they 
encounter international law.232  Indeed, one of the goals of having a standard 
interpretive framework such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties is to ensure that those engaging in the interpretive exercise at least 
 
 229. BG Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 1215–17 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 230. See Christopher Brown, A Comparative and Critical Assessment of Estoppel in International 
Law, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 369, 397–98 (1996); see also I.C. MacGibbon, The Scope of 
Acquiescence in International Law, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L. L. 143, 147–48 (1954). 
 231. ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, GROUNDS FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL RULES OF 
INTERPRETATION IN NATIONAL COURTS 9 (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2501962; see also Fabien Gélinas, From Harmonized Legislation to Harmonized Law: Hurdles 
and Tools, Judicial and Arbitral Perspectives, in THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW AFTER TWENTY-
FIVE YEARS: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 261, 262–64 
(Frédéric Bachand & Fabien Gélinas eds., 2013) (noting “best-case” scenario in which “the judge 
becomes an international judge.  She is keenly aware that she is applying a law intended to respond 
to the needs of a transnational community.  She thinks in terms of applying an international 
instrument; her reference points and sources are global.”). 
 232. See NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 231, at 1; Jean d’Aspremont, The Systemic Integration of 
International Law by Domestic Courts: Domestic Judges as Architects of the Consistency of the 
International Legal Order, in THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS AND THE 
(DE-)FRAGMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 141 (Fauchald & Nollkaemper eds., 2012). 
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employ the same rules—that they adopt the same interpretive approach.233  
Another is that there is an essential connection between primary norms and 
secondary norms, including those of interpretation, such that an international 
obligation severed from applicable secondary norms risks having its 
character changed.234 
Emphasis on interpretive rules should not obscure the underlying goal of 
the Vienna Convention.  The VCLT is utilitarian: “[T]he application of the 
rules on treaty interpretation is ‘not an aim in itself, but only a means to 
achieve another goal, i.e. the quest for the correct meaning of the terms of a 
treaty.’”235  One assumes that the court wants to reach the correct outcome, 
but the court will not necessarily regard the VCLT as the appropriate means 
of achieving its goal.  Thus, the incentive for national courts to apply the 
Vienna Convention for the sake of applying it is not strong, unless doing so 
would lead to the correct outcome.  And whether this is true might hinge 
more on the identity of the interpreters rather than on the rules themselves.  
The front-line interpreters of investment treaties are arbitral tribunals, and 
their approach to interpretation is far from uniform, even if their starting 
point is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.236 
 
 233. NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 231, at 3.  Professor Nollkaemper reminds us that differences in 
interpretation are not necessarily bad: “International law may lose some of its uniform meaning in 
this process, yet may gain domestic relevance.”  Id.  In addition, one should be mindful of the 
tendency of international lawyers (and others) to gain an exaggerated sense of their monopoly on the 
correct answer; “[epistemic communities] tend to be insular if not completely self-referential, and 
they often ignore what is going on in other areas, as they tend to believe that the only meaningful 
practice or the very core business of international law is their own specialization.” Bianchi, supra 
note 187 (citation omitted); see also supra pp. 112–14 supra (noting the attempt by the “community 
of international arbitration practitioners” to “leverage its prestige to mesmerize, or overawe, or bully, 
national courts into keeping their hands off the institution of international arbitration. . .”). 
 234. See, e.g., NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 231, at 10.  Professor Nollkaemper puts the issue in 
stronger terms: “The fundamental connection between primary and secondary norms should, so the 
argument goes, not be broken when a primary norm is transplanted into a domestic legal system.  If a 
court were to give effect to an international obligation disconnected from its secondary context, it 
does not give effect to that obligation, but to another norm.”  Id.  He acknowledges, however, some 
weaknesses to the proposition, including the argument that once a rule of international law is 
domesticated, it becomes part of the national legal order and thus could more properly be deemed 
national rather than international law.  Id. at 11–12.  This argument would not apply to a BIT, but 
query whether the subsidiary contract between the investor and the host state cannot migrate to and 
intersect with the domestic legal order. 
 235. Id. at 5 (citing Jan Wouters & Maarten Vidal, Non-Tax Treaties: Domestic Courts and Treaty 
Interpretation, in COURTS AND TAX TREATY LAW 11 (Guglielmo Maisto ed., 2007)). 
 236. For a general discussion, see J. ROMESH WEERAMANTRY, TREATY INTERPRETATION IN 
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (2012).  For a thoughtful exploration of the effect of different applicable 
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If one of the goals of a court called upon to interpret an international 
agreement is to find a construction that has been uniformly or at least widely 
accepted (which might indicate that it is correct), that court might well refer 
to the decisions of other courts that have addressed the same or a similar 
issue.  Deciding to which courts or tribunals referral is warranted, however, 
is likely to depend on matters “such as a common legal system, regional 
closeness, or political affinity, and so on.  These types of criteria may 
outweigh the role of common interpretive ground.”237  Moreover, whether 
another court’s decision is persuasive on its merits is likely to be the most 
powerful reason for another court’s decision to follow it, regardless of the 
interpretive method employed (although the interpretive method employed 
might bolster the persuasiveness of the interpretation). 
D. Conclusion 
It is inevitable that different tribunals whose members have different 
backgrounds will approach the process of interpretation in different ways 
and will likely reach different conclusions even with regard to the same 
treaty.  Even judges who have remarkably similar training and backgrounds 
can reach remarkably different results, viz. the difference between the 
majority and the dissent in BG Group.  The VCLT rules of interpretation, 
venerable though they might be, are not a “silver bullet” capable of 
penetrating the morass of meanings that can be attributed to investment 
treaties, although employment of uniform rules might help to achieve more 
consistent outcomes.  Their use might also help U.S. judges form their own 
interpretive community vis-à-vis international treaties.
238
  Detlev Vagts, 
writing in 1993, said: “The true difficulty with the practice of United States 
courts in treaty interpretation arises not from new theory, but from an old 
preference for reading treaties as fitting into the familiar landscape of 
American law, rather than facing the reality that treaties in fact change 
national law.”239 
 
laws on contract interpretation, see GIUDITTA CORDERO-MOSS, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS 210–25 (2014). 
 237. NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 231, at 14. 
 238. Detlev F. Vagts, Treaty Interpretation and New American Ways of Law Reading, 4 EUR. J. 
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